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Abstract: This Article examines the recent surge in statewide smoking bans.  
Nearly all states have some form of statewide ETS legislation, and the last five 
years have seen a revolution in the legal landscape, reversing the default rule on 
smoking in public from permissive to prohibitive of smoking. After establishing an 
analytical framework within which statewide ETS legislation coheres, and a 
typology of statewide smoking bans, this Article examines a disturbing trend in 
statewide ETS legislation: the increasing use of statewide ballot initiatives. After 
examining the shortcomings of direct legislation in the context of ETS legislation, 
this Article proposes a balancing test for remedial use by legislators, and 
demonstrates its application to an exemption area on which states divide: the 
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Governments have regulated tobacco for at least half a millennium.1 
Tobacco regulation in America can be traced to 1629, when the first General 
Letter of Instructions from the New England Company limited the production and 
use of tobacco in the Massachusetts Colony to medicinal purposes.2 Soon 
thereafter, “Blue Laws” grew up in the more theocratic colonies like New Haven, 
rigorously enforcing chaste Christendom by regulating ostentatious dress, the 
maternal kissing of children on the Sabbath, and the consumption of tobacco and 
liquor.3 Smoking on the streets was prohibited in Plymouth County in 1638, and 
Massachusetts prohibited smoking within five miles of any town in 1646.4 These 
regulations proved short-lived, however, as did the later revival of tobacco 
legislation during the Temperance movement.5   
This Article examines the modern descendant of these early efforts: the 
regulatory movement against secondhand smoke, more formally known as 
“Environmental Tobacco Smoke” (ETS). In the past thirty-five years, as the 
adverse consequences of ETS have been established and reaffirmed by Surgeons 
General and medical scholarship, laws regulating where smoking is permissible 
have swept the American states. The first seven years of the new millennium, in 
particular, have witnessed a transformative legislative crackdown on secondhand 
smoke across the nation—and, indeed, the globe.  
                                                 
1 In 1624, Pope Urban VIII banned the taking of snuff, finding the effects of tobacco too close to 
sexual ecstasy for comfort. SANDER GILMAN AND XUN ZHOU, SMOKE: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF 
SMOKING 15-16 (2004). In 1633, Sultan Murad IV closed the coffee-houses of Istanbul and 
prohibited the smoking of tobacco: “Smokers unfortunate enough to be caught red-handed were 
executed on the spot.” James Grehan, Smoking and “Early Modern” Sociability: The Great 
Tobacco Debate in the Ottoman Middle East (Seventeenth to Eighteenth Centuries), AM. HIST. 
REV., Dec. 2006 at 1363. In 1634, the Patriarch of Moscow prohibited the sale of tobacco, 
penalized by nose-slitting and whipping. In China, following the prohibition of tobacco-smoking 
in 1637, an enforcement decree was issued providing that “Those who hawk clandestinely 
Tobacco, and sell it to foreigners, shall, no matter the quantity sold, be decapitated, and their heads 
exposed on a pike.” L. Carrington Goodrich, Early Prohibitions of Tobacco in China and 
Manchuria, J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC’Y, Dec. 1938, at 650.  
2 GUSTAVUS MYERS, YE OLDEN BLUE LAWS 10-11 (The Century Company, 1921); Leon 
Goodman, Blue Laws, Old and New, 12 VIRGINIA LAW REGISTER 663,668 (1927). 
3 Blue laws, inter alia, regulated the modesty of clothing, imposed penalties for entertaining 
Quakers, and prohibited the kissing of children on the Sabbath. See id.; Henry G. Newton, Blue 
Laws of New Haven, 7 YALE L. J. 75 (1897). 
4 Goodman, supra note 2.  
5 After securing the Prohibition amendment, the National Women’s Christian Temperance Union 
unsuccessfully attempted a similar constitutional tobacco ban.  See Maureen O’Doherty, Price of a 
Soul: At What Cost Can The Tobacco Issue Be Resolved, in Ward, Kershaw, and Minton 
Environmental Symposium: Up In Smoke: Coming To Terms With The Legacy Of Tobacco: 
Introduction, 2 J. Health Care L. and Pol’y (1998-1999) at ix. Fourteen American states passed 
legislation restricting the sale or use of cigarettes, and New York prohibited women from smoking 
in public.  See Peter D. Jacobson et al., Historical Overview of Tobacco Regulation and 





 This eruption of legislation has transformed the public domain in 
American states from a predominantly smoke-friendly to a predominantly smoke-
free space. As this Article will propose, America has been—and continues to be—
engaged in the process of reversing the default rule on smoking in public from 
permissive to prohibitive. Where once smoking was generally permitted in public, 
excepting designated “No Smoking” areas, we increasingly live in a world in 
which insular smoking spaces are carved out of a public domain in which 
smoking is generally forbidden.   
Central to this transformation has been the widespread enactment of 
modern statewide smoking bans, the subject of this Article. Replacing earlier, 
more tentative regulations, these modern statewide bans eliminate second-hand 
smoke in workplaces, bars, restaurants, and other public places, with few 
exceptions. In the last five years, twenty-eight states have passed comprehensive 
ETS legislation. Texas, Iowa, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota legislatures are 
currently considering passing modern smoking bans, and in the next few years, 
more restrictive provisions of several states’ smoking regulations will take effect. 
Lawsuits challenging this legislation for both under-inclusiveness and over-
inclusiveness march to trial, and legislative committees consider amendments to 
smoking bans passed by ballot initiative.  
 Despite the profound reach of these recent developments, the statutory 
landscape is deeply undertheorized.  We lack as yet a theoretical framework 
within which to place statewide smoking bans—or even a basic survey of laws.  
Presently, an inchoate landscape of confused legislation confronts the observer as 
she surveys the several states’ ETS regimes.  A baffling array of exemption 
provisions emerges from the catalogue of legislation, documenting states’ efforts 
simultaneously to prevent involuntary exposure to secondhand smoke, limit 
unnecessary regulation and protect unintended consequences.   
 As the legal landscape continues to evolve, the need for theoretical 
guidance becomes increasingly acute. This Article offers a modest beginning to a 
comprehensive study of statewide ETS legislation—surveying the state of the 
law, identifying major areas of concern, and suggesting directions in which 
solutions might usefully be sought.  Part I reviews the landscape of statewide ETS 
legislation, and proposes a theoretical framework within which it coheres.  Part II 
undertakes a case study of an ETS statute passed by ballot initiative, which, as 
Part III concludes, presents serious procedural concerns. Part IV proposes a 
balancing test for use in evaluating exemptions, which can be used both to remedy 
deliberative failures in the passage of ballot initiatives, and to evaluate regimes 
currently in place.  Part V applies this test to an exemption area—tobacco 





provide a starting point for analysis, as American states aspire to craft ETS 
regimes which are both effective and responsible.   
  
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF STATEWIDE ETS LEGISLATION 
 
Modern ETS legislation in American states can be traced to 1972, when, 
six years after its first major study exposing the dire health consequences smoking 
had on smokers,6 the Surgeon General’s office issued a report suggesting that 
ambient tobacco smoke could damage the health of nonsmokers as well.7 Arizona 
passed the first statewide ETS legislation in 1973, banning smoking in all 
theaters, museums, libraries, elevators, and buses used by the public.8 Since then, 
state and local governments across America have gradually gone on to expand the 
sphere of nonsmoking public establishments. In 1975, Minnesota passed the first 
statute to forbid smoking in most workplaces.9 Other states followed suit with 
Clean Indoor Air Acts, and by 1980, over half the country—twenty-eight states—
had statutes on the books restricting public smoking in some form, usually 
covering the types of spaces covered in the Arizona ban.10 Through the eighties 
and nineties, various county and city governments followed Minnesota’s lead, 
instituting smoking restrictions in many workplaces. State and federal government 
action in those years, however, was limited. At the state level, little was banned 
aside from the narrow range of uncontroversial public spaces, such as schools and 
elevators, covered in Arizona’s 1973 statute. The federal government lent the 
anti-ETS movement only occasional and minor assistance—such as, for instance, 
the EPA’s designation of ETS as a Class A carcinogen in 1993.11 
Shortly after the EPA’s designation, legislative action on the state level 
picked up.  In 1994, states started passing a new category of laws—laws we refer 
to in this article as “modern statewide bans.” Modern statewide bans extend 
smoking prohibitions to three crucial categories of establishments: (1) restaurants, 
(2) bars, and (3) most other enclosed workplaces – nearly the entire indoor public 
                                                 
6 ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, SMOKING 
AND HEALTH (1964). 
7 OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 125-7 (1972 
(noting harmful effects of carbon monoxide exposure caused by proximity to smoking). 
8 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01 (1991). 
9 MINN. STAT. § 144.414 (2005).  
10 Robert A. Kagan & William P. Nelson, The Politics of Tobacco Regulation in the United States, 
in REGULATING TOBACCO 11, 11 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001). 
11 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: 
LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS, EPA/600/6-90/006F  (1993). Press Release available at 
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/smoke/01.htm In 1994, the Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration proposed to institute a comprehensive ban on smoking in over six million 
workplaces. See William N. Evans, Matthew C. Farelly & Edward Montgomery, Do Workplace 






domain. California, a pioneer in antismoking legislation, was the first to institute a 
modern statewide ban, amending its labor code in 1994 to immediately prohibit 
smoking in most enclosed places of employment, including restaurants.12  Though 
bars were initially exempt from the new law’s coverage, they too were required to 
be smoke-free by 1998.13  In the five years after California’s ban took full effect, 
a handful of other vanguard states joined California—including Delaware, which 
passed a modern statewide ban in 2002, and New York, which instituted a much-
discussed statewide ban in 2003. The true snowballing of statewide ETS 
legislation, has been in the last five years. Since 2003, twenty-eight state 
legislatures have passed statewide bans.14 
As thoroughgoing as the transformation wrought by the march of modern 
ETS legislation has been, we lack both a general survey of laws, and an analytical 
framework within which to understand the function and cumulative effect of these 
laws. These are the tasks of this Part.  Thus far, the only systematic evaluation of 
ETS legislation has been conducted inside the public health community. In 2002, 
an advisory committee convened by the National Cancer Institute published a 
study rating state clean indoor air laws. The study analyzed the extent to which 
statewide bans regulate smoking in various categories of locations, such as retail 
stores and schools, as well as the severity of their penalties and the effectiveness 
of their enforcement procedures.15 In years since, the American Medical 
Association has published an annual “Report Card” which, drawing largely from 
the ranking methodologies established in the NCI’s original study, ranks 
individual states on the effectiveness of their clean indoor air laws.16 These 
releases are concerned with the functional medical consequences of statewide 
bans, however, and elide the legal mechanics of statewide ETS regimes.  
The legal academy has not yet provided an overview of statewide ETS 
legislation.17 Relevant legal scholarship is essentially of two types. Some studies 
                                                 
12 1994 CAL. STAT. 310. 
13 CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5 (West 2003).  
14 See Appendix A. 
15 J.F. Chriqui et al., Application of a Rating System to State Clean Indoor Air Laws, 11 TOBACCO 
CONTROL 26-34 (2002). 
16 See AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, STATE OF TOBACCO CONTROL 2007 REPORT, available at 
www.lungusa.org.  
17 The closest we have to a general survey is 3 YALE J HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 157 (2002), 
which usefully assembles citations to cases and legislation concerning smoking in public. Sadly, 
this survey has become outdated. Jessica Niezgoda provides a good but limited review of 
California and New York regimes, and does not develop the national landscape. Jessica Niezgoda, 
Note, Kicking Ash(trays): Smoking Bans in Public Workplaces, Bars, and Restaurants, 33 J. 
LEGIS. 99 (2006). Marot Williamson collects constitutional challenges to statewide smoking bans, 
but the analysis is both limited and superficial. Marot Williamson, Note, When One Person’s 
Habit Becomes Everyone’s Problem: The Battle Over Smoking Bans in Bars and Restaurants, 14 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 161,168 (2007) (“The main debate surrounding smoking bans is 





focus in detail on an individual state or countywide ban, but provide only cursory 
glimpses of broader nationwide trends in anti-ETS legislation.18 The rest are 
almost entirely normative pieces—some of which advocate stronger legislation, 
such as a federal clean air act,19 while others bluntly repudiate efforts at ETS 
regulation.20 This Part, in conjunction Appendix A of this Article, seeks to 
address this gap by providing an overview of statewide smoking bans from a 
primarily legal perspective, and proposing a theoretical framework within which 
to understand them. 
Most modern statewide bans share a common intent: to protect 
unconsenting individuals from exposure to tobacco smoke in the public domain.  
From this common purpose, however, a chaotic landscape of wildly varying legal 
regimes has ensued. Though they may agree that nonsmokers should be protected 
from secondhand smoke, lawmakers have struggled to determine how and where 
the line between smoking and nonsmoking domains should be drawn. 
This, ultimately, is the central question in crafting effective and 
responsible ETS legislation. Which, if any, areas should be exempted from the 
operation of the new default rule? Ultimately, this Article will propose a 
balancing test to address this question, and suggest conclusions on some common 
exemption areas.  Before we can position ourselves to determine how lines 
between smoking and nonsmoking spaces should be drawn, we must first 
understand how states are drawing them now.  Accordingly, this Part establishes a 
typology of modern statewide smoking bans, and proposes an Ayresian analytical 




                                                 
18 Though narrow, some of these articles are quite helpful. Raphael’s piece in particular effectively 
reviews the early history of ETS legislation. See, e.g., Jordan C. Raphael, The Calabasas Smoking 
Ban: A Local Ordinance Points the Way for the Future of Environmental Tobacco Smoke 
Regulation, 80 S. CAL. L. REV 393 (2007); Jody Hogdon, Live Smoke Free or Die: The Battle for 
Smoke Free Restaurants in New Hampshire, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 49 (2004); Keith Woodeshick, note, 
Smoking Ban Legislation in New Jersey: Should Casinos Be Immune From Smoke?, 3 RUTGERS J. 
L. & URB. POL’Y 496 (2006); Justin C. Levin, note, Protect Us or Leave Us Alone: The New York 
State Smoking Ban, 68 ALB. L. REV. 183 (2004); Adrienne Detanico, comment, Banning Smoking 
in Chicago’s Social Scene: Protecting Labor and Broadening Public Health Policy, 40 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 1063 (2007). Out of sympathy to readers who will soon tire of saccharine 
smoking puns which suffuse the literature, I omit several unremarkable pieces from this review.   
19 Samuel J. Winokur, note, Seeing Through The Smoke: The Need For National Legislation 
Banning Smoking In Bars and Restaurants, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 662 (2007). 
20 See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Smoking Bans, 13 MO. ENV. L. & POL’Y 
REVIEW 94 (2005); Mark J. Horvick, Examining the Underlying Purposes of Municipal and 
Statewide Smoking Bans, 80 IND. L. J. 923 (2005); Joni Ogle, Why Smoking Bans Are a Butt to 
Texas: The Impact of Smoking Bans on Private Property Rights and Individual Freedom, 39 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 345 (2007) (arguing that, “by using smoking bans to protect citizens from their own 





A. THE FUNCTION AND INTENT OF STATEWIDE ETS LEGISLATION 
 
ETS legislation targets second-hand smoke, which has been identified in a 
number of Surgeon General’s reports as a “serious public health hazard”.21 
Therefore, statewide ETS statutes share a similar intent: to prevent involuntary 
exposure to secondhand smoke. Statewide ETS legislation does not aim to prevent 
smokers from harming themselves, but rather to prevent them from harming 
nonsmokers by producing ambient tobacco smoke in their presence.22 Employees 
are often a chief concern, as potentially unwilling but captive participants in the 
activities of co-workers or customers.23  In short, it is the externality problem 
posed by smoking—the costs smokers impose upon unconsenting nonsmokers by 
subjecting them to carcinogens—on which ETS legislation focuses and seek to 
eliminate.  
By seeking to prevent the exposure of unwilling individuals to ambient 
tobacco smoke, ETS legislation reflects public opinion fairly accurately. As Fred 
Pampel summarizes, “Public opinion surveys indicate that people respect the 
rights of smokers to enjoy their tobacco, if they are aware of the harm it does 
themselves, but also the rights of nonsmokers to stay free from the unwanted 
smoke of others and from the risks of involuntary smoking. Likewise a majority 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY 
EXPOSURE TO TOBACCO SMOKE,  i (2006)  (“We have made great progress since the late 1980s in 
reducing the involuntary exposure of nonsmokers in this country to secondhand smoke. . . . 
Despite the great progress that has been made, involuntary exposure to secondhand smoke remains 
a serious public health hazard that can be prevented by making homes, workplaces, and public 
places completely smoke-free.”) 
22 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 433.840 (2005) (“The people of Oregon find that because the 
smoking of tobacco creates a health hazard to those present in confined places, it is necessary to 
reduce exposure to tobacco smoke by requiring nonsmoking areas in certain places”). Oregon 
further provides that the Department of Human Services can waive the prohibition in areas “where 
a waiver will not significantly affect the health and comfort of nonsmokers”. OR. REV. STAT. § 
433.865 (2005). See also 2007 TENN. PUB. ACTS 410 (“The Tennessee Non-Smoker Protection 
Act”); MINN. STAT. § 144.412 (2007) (“The purpose of [this statute] is to protect employees and 
the general public from the hazards of secondhand smoke by eliminating smoking in public places, 
places of employment, public transportation, and at public meetings.”); 2006 Haw. Sess. Laws 295 
(“The purpose of this act is to protect the public health and welfare by prohibiting smoking in 
places open to the public and places of employment to ensure a consistent level of basic 
protections statewide from exposure to secondhand smoke.”) 
23 2004 Mass. Acts 137 (“to protect the health of the employees of the commonwealth.”); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 155.64 (2008) (“The purpose of this subdivision is to protect the health of the 
public by regulating smoking in enclosed workplaces and enclosed places accessible to the public, 
regardless of whether publicly or privately owned, and in enclosed publicly owned buildings and 
offices.”) WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.011 (2008) (“The people of the state of Washington 
recognize that exposure to secondhand smoke is known to cause cancer in humans. Secondhand 
smoke is a known cause of other diseases including pneumonia, asthma, bronchitis, and heart 
disease. Citizens are often exposed to secondhand smoke in the workplace, and are likely to 
develop chronic, potentially fatal diseases as a result of such exposure. In order to protect the 
health and welfare of all citizens, including workers in their places of employment, it is necessary 





of smokers accept the need to place restrictions on where they can light up.”24  It 
is thus unsurprising that the modern statewide bans we see today—legislation that 
attempts to protect the latter “right” (a nonsmoker’s right to smokeless air) 
without trampling unnecessarily on the former “right” (a smoker’s right to 
smoke)—have been so popular.  They are motivated by a goal that, excepting the 
hardcore fringe of “smokers’ rights” advocates, is universally accepted: protecting 
the unwilling from being exposed to the ill effects of secondhand smoke.   
 
B. A TYPOLOGY OF MODERN STATEWIDE ETS LEGISLATION 
 
Despite sharing a common intent, American states range widely in the 
nature and scope of their ETS regimes.  Five distinct classes, however, can be 
discerned with reference to exempted areas and pre-emption provisions, ranging 
from the most smoke-friendly to the most smoke-free: (I) “Thou Shalt Not Ban” 
States; (II) “Hands Off” States; (III) Mild Ban States; (IV) Strong Ban States; and, 
finally, (V) Teetotaling states.  
 
CLASS I: “THOU SHALT NOT BAN” STATES: THE NORTH CAROLINA MODEL 
 
 We start at the smokiest end of the spectrum, a narrow category including 
only three states: North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Iowa. Though these states 
have passed ETS legislation which regulates smoking in public areas, the function 
of these state laws is far more pre-emptive than regulatory. Class I statutes share 
the two characteristics. First, the smoking regulations are quite lax, permitting 
smoking in bars and restaurants.  Second, each of these statutes pre-empts local 
jurisdictions from passing more aggressive smoking bans. 
 North Carolina’s ETS regime is the weakest in the country.25 Most 
statewide bans exclusively target the health interests of nonsmokers, but North 
Carolina’s statute expressly adopts the interests of smokers, expressly intended 
“to address the needs and concerns of both smokers and nonsmokers in public 
places by providing for designated smoking and nonsmoking areas.”26 Solicitude 
                                                 
24 FRED C. PAMPEL, TOBACCO INDUSTRY AND SMOKING 62 (2004). 2007 Gallup poll data reveal 
that 54% of Americans would totally ban smoking in restaurants, 29% would totally ban smoking 
in bars, and 44% would totally ban smoking in workplaces. See GALLUP POLITICS AND 
GOVERNMENT, TOBACCO AND SMOKING, (Jul. 12-15, 2007) available at  
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1717/Tobacco-Smoking.aspx.  
25 This has everything to do with the primacy of North Carolina’s tobacco crop to the state’s 
economy. To this day, North Carolina remains the biggest producer of tobacco in the United 
States. See NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & CONSUMER SERVICES 
(MARKETING DIVISION), FIELD CROPS: TOBACCO, available at 
http://www.ncagr.com/markets/commodit/horticul/tobacco. (“Tobacco has always been an 
important part of North Carolina's economy and a vital crop to our producers.  Many people raised 
in this state can find a heritage relating to some area of the tobacco industry.”) 





for the rights of smokers is manifest in the operation of the statute. Aside from a 
narrow class of uncontroversial public spaces including schools and school buses, 
hospitals and nursing homes, libraries, museums, elevators, and a few other public 
spaces—largely mirroring Arizona’s 1973 ban—North Carolina’s current statute 
permits smoking in virtually all enclosed areas frequented by the public, including 
all restaurants and bars.27 State-owned arenas, coliseums, or auditoria may be 
designated nonsmoking—but only if they provide smoking areas in their 
lobbies.28 The statute bears the second hallmark of Class II regimes: a preemption 
clause prohibiting local governments from implementing stricter measures, 
effectively enshrining a right to smoke in every bar and restaurant in the state.29  
 Pennsylvania, Iowa, and South Dakota fill out Class I.30 Like North 
Carolina’s statute, both are relatively old as far as ETS laws are concerned—
Iowa’s was passed in 1987, Pennsylvania’s in 1988—and share the twin 
characteristics of Class I regimes. First, both adopt a permissive stance on 
smoking in enclosed spaces frequented by the public. All bars, for instance, are 
exempted from coverage in both states. As for restaurants, small dining 
establishments are completely free from smoking regulation: Pennsylvania 
exempts all restaurants with seventy-five seats or fewer, and Iowa’s all restaurants 
with fifty seats or fewer.  Even the larger restaurants that are covered by the 
statewide bans, however, need only designate a separate non-smoking area for 
                                                                                                                                     
concerns of both smokers and nonsmokers in public places by providing for designated smoking 
and nonsmoking areas.”) 
27 The statute provides that a narrow category of state government buildings, such as libraries and 
museums, “may be designated as nonsmoking”.  They do not, however, have to be. Other state-
government buildings may include designated nonsmoking areas so long as at least twenty percent 
of interior space—of equal quality—is reserved for smoking.  In all such buildings, the authority 
to decide whether to make any given state building predominantly nonsmoking is vested in “the 
appropriate department, institution, agency, or person in charge of the State-controlled 
department.” Even when such officials decide to include nonsmoking areas on their premises, 
however, the statute almost bends over to ensure the inadequacy of such nonsmoking areas by 
explicitly stating that it does not require installation of separate ventilation systems or other 
physical barriers designed to protect nonsmokers from secondhand smoke “in a manner which 
adds expense.” See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-597 (2007). 
28  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-597(a)(4).  
29 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-601(b) (“Any local ordinance, law, or rule that regulates smoking 
adopted on or after October 15, 1993 [the date of the state statute’s enactment], shall not contain 
restrictions regulating smoking which exceed those established in this Article.”) 
30 One caveat is required here with respect to South Dakota, which presents a unique case. Though 
it cuts across many of the features in Class II and III statutes, South Dakota’s statute is most 
accurately places with Class I regimes.  The text of the bill exempts “restaurants”, but then grants 
an exemption to licensed premises, so restaurants which serve alcohol are exempted.  This makes 
categorization with Class III regimes improper. As the statute preempts local jurisdictions from 
passing more restrictive bans, South Dakota must be placed in Class I. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
22-36-2 (2002).  More restrictive legislation has been proposed, which would prohibit smoking in 
restaurants and bars. See 2008 SD H.B. 1237 (Introduced Feb. 12, 2008) (Deleting provisions 





compliance.31 Second, both the Iowa and Pennsylvania laws contain preemption 
clauses prohibiting stricter regulations from being imposed at the local level.32 
These pre-emption provisions have survived legal challenges.33  Save for a narrow 
group of buildings subject to public ingress, the designation of an area as smoking 
or non-smoking is entirely at the discretion of its owner. Both Iowa and 
Pennsylvania legislatures, however, are presently considering bills which would 
implement modern statewide bans.34 
 
CLASS II: “HANDS OFF” STATES: THE TEXAS MODEL 
  
 The next class of statewide smoking ban adopts a more freewheeling 
approach.  Like their Class I counterparts, Class II states have not adopted general 
prohibitions on smoking in restaurants, bars, and most workplaces.  They differ, 
however, in one key regard – preemption.  Unlike North Carolina and its brethren, 
the states in this second category permit local jurisdictions to ban secondhand 
smoke wherever they choose, including restaurants and bars. These states, in 
short, take a “hands-off” approach to ETS regulation of bars and restaurants, 
leaving the matter to local jurisdictions. This is the most common form of 
statewide ETS legislation: Alabama, Alaska, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, 
                                                 
31 35 PENN. STAT. § 1230.1 (2007).  
32 See 35 PENN. STAT. § 1235.1; IOWA CODE § 14.2.B.6. Of the three Class I statutes, only Iowa’s 
states a policy rationale for preemption. “For the purpose of equitable and uniform 
implementation, application, and enforcement of state and local laws and regulations, the 
provisions of this chapter shall supersede any local law or regulation which is inconsistent with or 
conflicts with the provisions of this chapter.” Id. 
33 In recent years, as states across the country were passing modern statewide bans, rebellious 
local jurisdictions in both Iowa and Pennsylvania tested the pre-emption clauses by passing more 
stringent local bans. Allegheny County, Pennsylvania sought to completely ban smoking in 
restaurants and bars, and the city of Ames, Iowa passed a citywide ordinance seeking to ban 
smoking in all of its restaurants between the hours of 6:30am and 8:30pm.. See Anita 
Srikameswaran, Allegheny City Council Passes Smoking Ban, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sep. 
27, 2006; Frank Santiago, Cities, Towns Monitor Fate of Ames Smoking Ban, DES MOINES 
REGISTER, Aug. 19, 2002, at 1B. In both cases, restaurants financially backed by Big Tobacco 
promptly sued, arguing that the counties had exceeded their authority under state law and that the 
local bans should thus be overturned. Ames responded by claiming it had an inherent authority to 
pass such an act under “home rule” powers granted by the state constitution. See James 
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Ames, 661 N.W.2d 150 (Iowa, May 7, 2003). Allegheny County 
defended its smoking ban by arguing that the state law’s preemption clause had been implicitly 
overridden by subsequent state legislation. See Mitchell’s Bar & Restaurant, Inc. v. Allegheny 
County, 924 A.2d 730 (Pa. Cmwlth., May 22, 2007).  Neither argument prevailed: unable to 
disregard the preemption clauses in the state statutes, courts in both states ruled in favor of the 
restaurants and struck down the local bans.  See, e.g., Mitchell’s Bar, 924 A.2d at 739 
(“Regardless of our own sense as to whether local communities should be permitted to impose 
stricter regulations in this area, we may only interpret and apply the law as set forth by the General 
Assembly and, when they specify that the Act preempts local legislation, we must apply the Act to 
do so.”).   





West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming all implement statewide Class II 
regimes. 
 Granting broad discretion to local governments, Class II regimes vary 
widely in regulating secondhand smoke. Across the board, the large cities located 
in this Category II—cities such as Detroit, Milwaukee, Omaha, and the major 
Texas cities, among others—have their own smoking bans, many of which ban 
smoking in restaurants in bars.  Living in a large city in a “Hands-Off” state can 
be much like living in one of the Category III, IV, or V states discussed below.  
Even among metropolises governed by Class II regimes, however, there is 
enormous variation. Some large cities, such as Dallas, still permit smoking in all 
bars—placing themselves closer to the regulatory regimes found in Category III. 
Other large cities in Category II, such as Madison, Wisconsin, and Fort Wayne, 
Indiana, have made virtually all enclosed public spaces smoke free, including 
smoking lounges—placing them closer to Category V.35  Smaller towns may have 
their own bans as well, as do some rural areas. As a general matter, however, 
aggressive regulation is far more common in larger cities. In Michigan, for 
instance, only twenty counties—counties including all of the state’s major 
cities—have adopted their own smoking bans.36  Michigan’s other sixty-three 
counties, which together account for the vast majority of the state’s rural area, are 
currently ban-free.  
Despite these variations in practice, the state-level legal regimes of Class 
II states cohere on the more permissive end of the state law spectrum. Neither 
Class I nor Class II regimes attempt to reverse the default rule at the state level. 
Rather, these regimes declare narrow classes of the public domain smoke-free, 
and Class I regimes prohibit local jurisdictions from regulating further. All of the 
remaining states which have passed statewide ETS legislation, however, do 
attempt to reverse the default rule from generally permissive to generally 
prohibitive of smoking in public, addressing one or both of the areas identified in 
the 2006 Surgeon General’s report—restaurants and bars.37 It is to those states 
that we turn next. 
 
 
                                                 
35Madison passed a city-wide ban in 2005, prohibiting smoking in restaurants, bars and 
workplaces, but grandfathers in specially designated, closed-off, separately ventilated rooms 
presently in existence in restaurants, if approved by the Public Health Department. See MADISON, 
WIS., Ordinance 23.05 (Jul. 1, 2005). Available at 
http://www.cityofmadison.com/health/envhealth/23.05-070105.pdf. The Fort Wayne City Council 
passed an extremely rigorous smoking ban in 2007. FORT WAYNE, IN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 
95 § 95.60-99 (Jan. 16, 2007) 
36 See http://www.makemiairsmokefree.com/smokefree-progress.php (follow “In Michigan” 
hyperlink). 
37 OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 22 at 145-154 (identifying restaurants, 





CLASS III: MILD BAN STATES: THE IDAHO MODEL 
 
As we continue our progress on the spectrum of statewide ETS legislation 
from smokiest to most smoke-free, the next Class we encounter is composed of 
states which begin to make inroads on the default rule. Class III states, which 
prohibit smoking in restaurants but exempt bars, include Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and 
Tennessee.38  This stance reflects the opinion of many Americans that, while 
smokers should be prevented from lighting up in dining establishments, they 
should be allowed to do so in bars.39  
 Class III bans vary on two important points: the definition of “bar,” and 
the question of preemption. Florida limits the bar exemption to “stand-alone 
bars”, with a list of fairly specific qualifications.40 Other states define “bar” fairly 
generally.41 With regard to preemption, the majority of Class III states do not 
forbid local governments from passing stricter local ordinances. Some explicitly 
preserve this authority.42 
Virtually all of the mild ban states thus function as a floor rather than a 
ceiling; local jurisdictions in these states remain free to ban smoking in bars.43 
Class III laws therefore range from states like Arkansas—which defines “bar” 
broadly and frees local jurisdictions to impose their own more rigorous bans, to 
states such as Oregon, which defines “bar” more narrowly and preempts local 
jurisdictions from passing stricter bans.  In prohibiting smoking in restaurants 
statewide, however, Class III states cohere as having made significant progress 
beyond Class I and II towards the aspirations expressed in the 2006 Surgeon 
                                                 
38 Some qualification is necessary with respect to Georgia and Oregon.  With these, the dispositive 
factor is not the nature of the establishment—restaurant or bar—but the age floor of the patrons. 
An establishment which neither employs minors nor permits them to enter its premises may allow 
smoking.  GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12A-6 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 433.835 (2005). It is likely that 
this functions much like a restaurant/bar split, however, because most restaurants permit children.  
39 See Lydia Saad, More Smokers Feeling Harassed by Smoking Bans, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, 
July 25, 2007 (quoting survey results from July 2007 showing that, while 54% of Americans 
support smoking bans in restaurants, only 29% favor banning it in bars). Available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/28216/More-Smokers-Feeling-Harassed-Smoking-Bans.aspx. 
40 FLA. STAT. § 386.203 (2007) (Stipulating inter alia that “the licensed premises is not located 
within, and does not share any common entryway or common indoor area with, any other enclosed 
indoor workplace”). 
41 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12A-2  (2007) (“‘Bar’ means an establishment that is devoted to 
the serving of alcoholic beverages for consumption by guests on the premises and in which the 
serving of food is only incidental to the consumption of those beverages, including, but not limited 
to, taverns, nightclubs, cocktail lounges, and cabarets.”) 
42 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-2(b) (2007) (“This Code section shall be cumulative to and 
shall not prohibit the enactment of any other general and local laws, rules and regulations of state 
or local agencies, and local ordinances prohibiting smoking which are more restrictive than this 
Code section.”) 
43 Oregon and Tennessee have pre-emption clauses. See OR. REV. STAT. § 433.863 (2005); TENN 





General’s report, to protect the unwilling from exposure to ETS. By exempting 
bars from statewide coverage, however, and in some cases preempting further 
regulation, Class III states leave a significant swath of the public domain 
unregulated.  
 
CLASS IV: STRONG BAN STATES: THE D.C. AND NEW YORK MODELS 
 
 Fourth on the ETS spectrum lie those regimes that ban smoking in the vast 
majority of enclosed public spaces statewide, including not only all restaurants, 
but conventional bars as well. These states carve out exemptions, however, for 
bars and cafes devoted exclusively to the smoking of tobacco. California, 
Colorado, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, and Rhode Island are all Class IV states. Though the first statute went 
into force in 1998, the vast majority of Class IV regimes are far more recent, 
becoming effective between 2003 and 2007. This novelty, combined with the 
strong protections provided by Class IV and V regimes, warrants the designation 
“modern statewide ban”, which will be used in this Article to distinguish these 
strong, recent regimes from other forms of statewide ETS legislation. 
 Within Class IV, statutes differ most meaningfully in how they define the 
exempted smoking establishments. These statutes generally set tobacco lounges 
apart from regular bars by specifying a minimum percentage of revenue that must 
come from the on-site sale of tobacco products. Washington D.C., for instance, 
defines a “tobacco bar” as “a restaurant, tavern, brew pub, club, or nightclub that 
generates 10% or more of its total annual revenue from the on-site sale of tobacco 
products, excluding sales from vending machines, or the rental of on-site 
humidors.”44 Not every Class IV state defines tobacco lounges this way. Some, 
such as Rhode Island, require more than half of the store’s revenue to come from 
sale of tobacco products—a standard that can be very difficult for establishments 
which serve alcohol to meet in practice. 45 Others, such as Massachusetts, impose 
no mandatory numerical minimum percentage of revenue that must come from 
tobacco products, but merely require that sale of tobacco be the store’s “primary” 
purpose, and that sale of food and drink be “incidental to” the sale of tobacco 
products.46  
                                                 
44 D.C. CODE § 7-741 (2008). 
45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.10-2 (requiring that exempted smoking bars “annually demonstrate that 
revenue generated from the serving of tobacco products is greater than the total combined revenue 
generated by the serving of beverages and food.”) 
46 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 270, § 22  (2008) (defining a “Smoking bar” as “an establishment that 
occupies exclusively an enclosed indoor space and that primarily is engaged in the retail sale of 
tobacco products for consumption by customers on the premises; derives revenue from the sale of 
food, alcohol or other beverages that is incidental to the sale of the tobacco products; prohibits 
entry to a person under the age of 18 years of age during the time when the establishment is open 





Not all states, however, exempt all forms of tobacco lounge. Maine’s 
statute, for instance, allows most types of tobacco products to be smoked in 
specialty tobacco stores, but was amended in 2007 expressly to disallow the 
smoking of hookah pipes.47 Colorado exempts “cigar-tobacco bars”.48 These 
inexplicable distinctions have caused quite a bit of confusion.49  
Class IV states vary in one other significant respect: whether they include 
per se exemptions for tobacco bars or grandfather clause provisions. The first 
category of statute, the less restrictive of the two, permits smoking in both (a) all 
currently existing tobacco bars, and (b) any tobacco bars that may be opened in 
the future. Class IV states extending per se exemptions to tobacco bars include 
California, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. These 
statutes function by simply (A) defining a “tobacco” or “cigar” bar in one of the 
ways noted above, (B) including such a bar their lists of exemptions, and (C) 
requiring that all such bars maintain valid state permits.  
 The use of grandfather clause exemptions is more limited in scope. 
Colorado, Connecticut, Maine,50 New York, New Jersey, and New Mexico 
exempt only pre-existing tobacco lounges. Grandfather clause exemptions 
                                                                                                                                     
the premises; maintains a valid permit for the retail sale of tobacco products as required to be 
issued by the appropriate authority in the city or town where the establishment is located; and, 
maintains a valid permit to operate a smoking bar issued by the department of revenue.”) 
California exempts “private smokers’ lounges”, which must be in or attached to retail shops. CAL 
LAB CODE § 6404.5 (Deering 2007) 
47 ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 22, § 1542 (2007) (“Smoking a waterpipe or hookah is prohibited in a 
tobacco specialty store that is newly licensed or that requires a new license after January 1, 
2007.”). 
48COLO. REV. STAT. 25-14-203 (2007) (“a bar that, in the year ending December 31, 2005, 
generated at least five percent or more of its total annual gross income or fifty thousand dollars in 
annual sales from the on-site sale of tobacco products and the rental of on-site humidors, not 
including any sales from vending machines.  In any calendar year after December 31, 2005, a bar 
that fails to generate at least five percent of its total annual gross income or fifty thousand dollars 
in annual sales from the on-site sale of tobacco products and the rental of on-site humidors shall 
not be defined as a ‘cigar-tobacco bar’ and shall not thereafter be included in the definition 
regardless of sales figures.”)  
49 Many of the shisha lounges in New York, for instance, were initially held not to qualify for the 
state’s cigar bar exemption because they did not serve alcohol on their premises. See Corey 
Kilgannon, A Cultural History Faces Stringent Smoking Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004 (quoting 
City Councilman Mark Vallone: “I’ve asked that the city give [the shisha lounges] exclusion from 
the smoking laws because they fit into a cigar bar exemption . . . . The only difference is that they 
don't serve alcohol. But should they be punished for that?”). New Jersey’s exemption partially—
but only partially—avoids such confusion by expanding its coverage to include the “cigar lounge” 
as well as the “cigar bar,” thereby clarifying that an establishment need not serve alcohol in order 
to qualify for the exemption. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-57 (2007). 
50 Maine exempts all “tobacco specialty stores” that, by the end of 2006, possessed licenses to 
serve alcohol or food, effectively creating a grandfather clause exemption for tobacco lounges. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 22, § 1542(L) (2007) (“Smoking is not prohibited in a tobacco specialty 
store. The on-premises service, preparation or consumption of food or drink, if the tobacco 
specialty store is not licensed for such service or consumption prior to January 1, 2007, is 





function much as do the comprehensive exemptions above—only they insert 
temporal limitations into their definitions of the “tobacco bars” that qualify. That 
is, in addition to establishing a definition of “tobacco bar,” and a regulatory 
framework that such bars must use to remain exempt, the grandfather clause states 
also impose on all tobacco bars eligible for the exemption a mandatory cut-off 
date for being in business—a cut-off disqualifying all new tobacco bars from the 
exemption.  
Where grandfather clause exemptions are in effect, no new cigar bar or 
shisha lounge seeking to allow its patrons to smoke is permitted to do so—unless 
it can manage to squeeze itself through a different loophole, such as those for 
“owner-operated businesses” or “private clubs.” Most, like New York, not only 
forbid new tobacco bars from opening; they also forbid existing ones from 
expanding or even changing ownership, which may facilitate their gradual 
extinction.51 On the spectrum from smoke-friendly to smoke free states, then, the 
strong ban states with grandfather clauses toe the line between their per se 
counterparts in Class IV and the final category of statewide smoking bans.  
 
CLASS V.  TEETOTALING STATES: THE WASHINGTON STATE MODEL 
 
Sitting at the farthest end of our ETS spectrum, Class V statewide 
smoking bans are the most aggressive in the nation. These states are similar in 
virtually all regards to Class IV bans, save that they do not exempt tobacco 
lounges. Due to their uncompromising rigor in stamping out smoking from the 
public domain, bans in this category earn the moniker “Teetotaling”. States with 
Class V bans include Arizona, Delaware, Ohio, Maryland, Minnesota, and 
Washington State. These statutes are the most recent, and are increasingly passed 
by health advocacy lobbies through ballot initiatives: Washington State in 2005, 
followed quickly by Ohio and Arizona in 2006.   
Teetotaling statutes’ coverage is so broad that they generally need not 
specify specific types of establishments—such as “restaurants” or “bars”—to 
which the prohibitions apply. Instead, they tend to operate by banning smoking in 
all indoor “public places” and all indoor “places of employment,” and then 
carving out extremely narrow, tightly (and often deceptively defined) exemptions. 
                                                 
51 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-q (Consol. 2008) ( Exempting “Cigar bars that, in the calendar 
year ending December thirty-first, two thousand two, generated ten percent or more of its total 
annual gross income from the on-site sale of tobacco products and the rental of on-site humidors, 
not including any sales from vending machines, and is registered with the appropriate enforcement 
officer . . . Such registration shall remain in effect for one year and shall be renewable only if: (a) 
in the preceding calendar year, the cigar bar generated ten percent or more of its total annual gross 
income from the on-site sale of tobacco products and the rental of on-site humidors, and (b) the 
cigar bar has not expanded its size or changed its location from its size or location since December 






All exempt private residences, but exemptions for other enclosed spaces are 
sparingly granted. Some Class V states include a very small number of extremely 
vague exemptions.  In Washington State, for instance, “certain private 
workplaces” are the only workplaces exempt from the state’s clean indoor air law. 
The statute nebulously defines these as “a private enclosed workplace, within a 
public place, even though such workplace may be visited by nonsmokers.”52 
Other Class V statutes take the opposite tack, including longer lists of very 
specific exemptions.  Minnesota’s Clean Indoor Air Act, for example, in addition 
to exempting private residences from coverage, allows smoking in retail tobacco 
shops, heavy commercial and farming vehicles, family farms, disabled veterans 
rest camps, and theatrical productions, buildings where scientific studies of 
smoking are being conducted, and buildings where traditional Native American 
ceremonies are held.53 Whether they choose a very small number of broad 
exemptions, or a large number of narrow ones, however, the result is largely the 
same: smoking in virtually the entire indoor public domain—and some of the 
outdoor—is verboten. Some bans, such as Washington’s, also ban smoking within 
a certain distance of a building opening through which smoke could conceivably 
enter—such as building entrances, openable windows, or ventilation intakes.54  
Consistent with this aggressive stance on secondhand smoke, none of the 
Category V statutes are expressly negatively preemptive.55  Each imposes a floor 
on ETS regulation rather than a ceiling. Though teetotaling smoking bans tend to 
leave little room for municipal action, some creative localities have managed to 
expand coverage to prohibit smoking in parks, sidewalks, and cars with open 
windows.56 Some local jurisdictions are beginning to extend smoking bans into 
the home.57 
 
C. ETS LEGISLATION: FLIPPING THE DEFAULT 
 
American states have established a patchwork quilt of ETS regimes, 
intended to protect the unwilling from exposure to ambient tobacco smoke.  At 
first glance, statewide ETS legislation seems to present a jumbled and unsightly 
landscape of law. Upon closer analysis, however, several organizing principles 
                                                 
52 WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.060 (2008).  
53 MINN. STAT. § 144.4167 (2007). 
54 WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.075 (2008). 
55 Courts, however, have held provisions to be preemptive. See J.T.R. Colebrook, Inc., v. Town of 
Colebrook, 829 A.2d 1089 (N.H. 2003) (Because the New Hampshire State Indoor Smoking Act 
is a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme, it preempts local authority). 
56See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Maine City Bans Smoking In Cars With Children, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 
2007. 
57 See, e.g., Sanjay Bhatt, Smoking Foes Bring The Fight To Apartment Buildings, SEATTLE 





emerge, allowing us more effectively to understand the function and effect of ETS 
legislation.   
As the foregoing survey demonstrates, the mere fact of having a statewide 
ETS regime on the books reveals very little about a state’s regulatory policy. A 
regulatory spectrum can be discerned with reference to exemption provisions, 
ranging from states which prohibit meaningful ETS regulation, to states which 
prohibit smoking in virtually all places subject to public ingress.   
I believe we can most effectively understand this spectrum, and the 
emerging landscape of what this Article will call “modern statewide bans”, in 
Ayresian terms.  Under this analysis, the fundamental question distinguishing 
mere ETS legislation from a meaningful smoking ban is the nature of the default 
rule. Is the default rule prohibitive, or permissive, of smoking in public?   
On the one side lie bans which leave the pre-regulation default rule in 
place, and prohibit smoking in narrow categories of public places. These regimes 
may prohibit further regulation at a local level (Class I), or permit municipalities 
to institute further prohibitions, (Class II) but both Classes leave the pre-
regulation default rule unmodified at a state level. Class III regimes make inroads 
on reversing the default rule, but in leaving bars, a major source of involuntary 
ETS exposure, unregulated at a state level, and in some cases pre-empting local 
action, fail fully to reverse the default rule. 
On the other side are bans which successfully reverse the default rule, and 
carve out exemption areas in which smoking is permitted. Some (Class IV) tailor 
the legislation narrowly to exempt areas where nonsmokers are unlikely to be 
present, such as tobacco bars. Others (Class V) create a near-complete mandatory 
rule against smoking in public.   
Under this analytical framework, it is clear that “modern statewide bans”, 
or Classes IV and V, are a distinct species of statewide ETS legislation.  These 
statutes reverse the default rule to establish a presumptive prohibition of smoking 
in nearly all public places, against which exemptions can be carved by state 
legislatures.58 Codified in nineteen American states, modern statewide bans have 
been incrementally reversing the nation-wide default rule on smoking in public 
places.  
These modern statewide bans are the subject of this Article. If we are to 
understand them, we must understand one critical point: they are exemption-
centric. The point about which a state reverses the default rule is determined by its 
exemption scheme. This, after all, is the central question posed by modern 
statewide bans: which public spaces should be exempted from the operation of the 
new default rule? At their best, modern statewide bans attempt to balance the two 
“rights” in play – the smoker’s against the non-smoker’s – by isolating areas 
                                                 





which do not undermine the function of an effective ETS regime, like areas in 
which non-smokers are unlikely to be exposed to ambient tobacco smoke.    
Even among modern statewide bans, however, states exhibit a startling 
degree of variations on this question: which areas do not undermine a strong ETS 
regime?  Perhaps this represents the considered judgment of different states 
concerning how much protection is warranted—an optimistic “states as 
laboratory” view—but it may be that a certain amount of caprice may be 
responsible for the variation, and deliberative failures draw states away from 
narrowly tailored, responsible, and effective ETS legislation.  Certainly the 
delicately balanced, exemption-centric nature of ETS legislation gives reason for 
pause, because the character of an ETS regime can be dramatically altered by the 
choice of one exemption against another.  In the next Part, I will examine a recent 
trend in the passage of statewide smoking bans that presents particularly severe 
concerns on this point: the increasing use by pressure groups of the ballot 


































II. CASE STUDY: THE OHIO SMOKE FREE WORKPLACE ACT 
 
[W]as the Ohio voting public fooled by a ballot issue that purported to be something that it was 
not? 
Ohio Licensed Beverage Association v. Ohio Department of Health, (Cain, J.)59 
 
Thanks to the laudable work of Surgeons General, we are now aware of 
the health threats posed by environmental tobacco smoke, and we have made 
significant progress in flipping the default rule on smoking in public from 
smoking to nonsmoking.  Though in the past this has been chiefly accomplished 
by state statutes passed by conventional legislative means, the tempo of ETS 
ballot initiatives has accelerated dramatically in recent years. Following the 
successful 2005 passage of a statewide ETS ballot initiative in Washington, three 
states saw the passage of similar initiatives in 2006: Ohio, Arizona, and Nevada. 
 Insofar as ballot initiatives have contributed to the process of reversing 
the default rule on smoking in public, they must be commended. However, ballot 
initiatives present unique dangers to good law in the context of ETS legislation. 
ETS legislation is essentially a choice of exemptions: exempting some areas, like 
restaurants and bars, undercuts the purpose of modern ETS legislation and may 
fail to flip the default, while failing to exempt others may take the legislation well 
beyond what is necessary to protect the public health.  
As we have seen, in reversing the default rule from a general permission 
for smoking in public places to a general prohibition, the essential question is 
where a state draws the line—which areas will be exempted.  Excellent arguments 
obtain for several exemption areas which are consistent with the public health 
function of ETS legislation.  Recognizing this, states have carved out exemptions 
against the default rule which tailors the legislation more closely to its public 
health purpose.   Though some seem overbroad, and others are overly narrow, 
these exemptions represent the efforts of states to confront the problem head-on – 
to decide where the line is best drawn between protecting the public health and 
intruding unnecessarily on the public domain.   
Ballot initiatives, however, are prone to focus attention on a general policy 
question at stake, at the expense of other significant details.  They are therefore 
particularly worrying legislative vehicles for ETS legislation, to which the finer 
points of the exemption scheme are of paramount importance in determining the 
character of the new regime. The mere fact of an ETS bill’s passage by ballot 
initiative may say very little about public support for, let alone the substantive 
advisability of, its exemption scheme.  
                                                 






The passage of the Ohio Smoke Free Workplace Act presents a sharp 
example of the dangers to responsible legislation posed by ETS ballot initiatives. 
According to the summary on the ballots, the proposed statute would “restrict 
smoking in places of employment and most places open to the public”, with a list 
of exemptions including outdoor restaurant patios, tobacco stores, private clubs, 
and most private residences.60 Within weeks it was clear, in the words of an Ohio 
law professor, that “we voted for a lie.”61 Within months an Ohio trial court had 
declared that despite statutory language to the contrary, “no such exemption [for 
private clubs] actually does exist.” 62 By December 2007, an Ohio appellate court 
threw up its hands and handed the imbroglio over to the General Assembly to 
resolve.63 
As legislators tackle this unenviable task, they are confronted with vexing 
questions of deference: what exactly did Ohio voters intend to enact, and how 
extensively should legislators defer to the text of the proposed bill?  A fuller 
understanding of the more tragic elements in this farce will provide guidance for 
legislators as they attempt to decipher what voters intended to express at the polls, 
determine what degree of deference the bill should be afforded in amendment, 
and perhaps recover missed opportunities for carefully crafted and responsible 




On March 10, 2005, the American Cancer Society, through its Ohio agent 
“SmokeFree Ohio” (SFO) delivered an ultimatum to the Ohio General Assembly.  
Having drafted an ETS bill, SFO demanded a legislative rubber-stamp.  If one 
were not forthcoming, or if the Ohio Assembly were to debate and possibly 
amend the proposal, SFO would launch a petitioning campaign to pass the bill by 
ballot initiative.64   
Ohio, one of the states swept up by the Progressive era tide of direct 
democracy, had amended its Constitution in 1912 to provide for legislation by 
                                                 
60 See Ohio Sec’y of State, State Issue 5 Certified Ballot Language (Nov. 7, 2006), available at 
www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/ElectionsVoter/results2006.aspx?Section=2322.  
61 David F. Forte, Op-ed., More Smoke-Free Than You Thought, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 
17, 2006, at  B9. 
62 Ohio Licensed Beverage Assn. v. Ohio Dep't of Health,, supra note 60, ¶ 9.   
63 Ohio Licensed Beverage Assn. v. Ohio Dep't of Health, 2007-Ohio-7147, ¶ 41 (“[A]ny potential 
change to the exemption as enacted would be a matter for the legislature, not the 
administrative agency, to address.”); 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6277. 
64 Press Release, SmokeFree Ohio, American Cancer Society Launches Campaign To Pass a 
Statewide Clean Air Law  (Mar. 10, 2005) available at 
http://smokefreeohio.org/oh/news/050310LaunchCampaign.aspx (“If the Ohio General Assembly 
does not take action, or tries to amend the law, the American Cancer Society and its partners will 






ballot initiative.  Under Article II, Section 1B, by filing a sufficient number of 
signatures with the Secretary of State, any citizen or organization could place 
legislation before the General Assembly.  The legislature could pass, amend and 
pass, or reject the proposal. If amended or rejected, upon the filing of further 
signatures the petition would be placed on the state ballot for adoption by Ohio 
voters, and would trump any amended version passed by the legislature.65 
That ETS legislation for Ohio was imminent was not in dispute. As a 
lobbyist for the Ohio Licensed Beverage Association (OLBA) observed, “there 
will be a statewide policy.  The question is what will that be?”66 On that finer 
point, however, public opinion was unclear.  A 2005 poll, conducted by the 
statewide trade organization, revealed a 55 percent majority in support of a very 
limited statewide ban. A 2006 poll conducted by health activists, on the other 
hand, revealed a 52.3 percent majority in favor of a blanket ban, with a 3.4 
percent margin of error.67   
The restaurant and bar industry hoped that the legislature would tackle the 
issues raised in the bill and craft a more “reasonable” bill.68 Unwilling to subject 
their bill to examination and potential amendment by the legislature, however, the 
American Cancer Society instructed the legislature “to do nothing” and “leave 
this to the Ohio voters”,69 insisting that the legislature should not debate or amend 
the bill and “allow the issue to go to the statewide ballot next November”.70 The 
anti-deliberative nature of this tactic was not lost on the news media. Noting the 
“aggressive” character of SFO’s proposal, the Cleveland Plain Dealer observed 
that “their plan leaves no room for compromise”.71 
The restaurant and bar lobby responded to the American Cancer Society’s 
ultimatum with a proposal of its own.  On the 19th of April, Ohio’s Attorney 
General approved language for a constitutional amendment sponsored by OLBA, 
which had formed an organization called “SmokeLess Ohio” (SLO) for the 
                                                 
65 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1b. 
66 Harlan Specter, Cancer Society Tells Ohio to Ban Indoor Smoking, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, 
Mar. 11, 2005, at A1. 
67 Peggy O’Farrell, Smoking Ban Gets Support, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 6, 2006, at 1B.  
68 Jim Provance, Anti-Tobacco Activists File Petitions to Ban Most Public Smoking in Ohio, 
TOLEDO BLADE, Nov. 18, 2005.   
69 See podcast, Cleveland City Club, Jacob Evans vs. Tracy Sabetta, Debate: Smoke Less Ohio vs. 
Smoke Free Ohio (108), (Oct. 30, 2006) available at 
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purpose, and was generously backed by the tobacco industry. Where SFO’s 
approach had been anti-deliberative, OLBA’s tack was flatly misleading.  Though 
the proposed constitutional amendment was pitched as an alternative “smoking 
ban”, prohibiting smoking in some limited public spaces, it would it would also 
supersede municipal clean air ordinances and preempt legislation concerning 
second-hand smoke in restaurants and bars, effectively enshrining the right to 
smoke in restaurants and bars in the Ohio constitution.72   
No other proposals appeared. The Ohio legislature followed the American 
Cancer Society’s laissez-faire instructions, and the proposals, neither debated nor 





Through the summer of 2006, the restaurant and bar lobby faced off 
against the American Cancer Society lobby in a race to gather enough petitions to 
appear on the November 2006 ballot. The arguments seemed straightforward 
enough. The American Cancer Society, through its organization SmokeFree Ohio, 
pushed its legislation on public health grounds, and the Ohio Licensed Beverage 
Association, through SmokeLess Ohio, opposed the initiative on economic 
grounds, concerned that small businesses relied on smoking patrons. 
The petitioning phase was fraught with deceit, confusion and 
misinformation.  Both organizations employed professional signature-gathering 
companies, paying a set price for each signature obtained, or contracting to 
purchase a set number of petition signatures.73 Enterprising signature-gatherers 
worked for both organizations, simultaneously obtaining signatures for both bills. 
The SLO petitioners, paid between $1 and $2 per signature, bore no particular 
allegiance to the truth in their quest to assemble signatures, for each of which they 
received between $1 and $2. Petition circulators pitched the constitutional 
amendment as a more reasonable alternative to the ACS bill, asking registered 
voters to sign and indicate support for “the smoking ban” and falsely assured 
signatories that the initiative would not supersede municipal clean air 
ordinances.74  Tactics grew increasingly desperate as the summer wore on, and 
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affirmative deceptions emerged. A health official reported that SLO petition 
circulators told him that the stricter SFO proposal would “prohibit smoking in 
your home, which it doesn’t.”75 NBC news crews caught several of these 
misleading statements on camera during an exposé on deception in the petitioning 
process.76 Petition circulators forged signatures, sometimes with the names of 
deceased voters.77 
SmokeFree Ohio was not without fault in the early stages of the 
petitioning process. Contracted petition circulators misrepresented their employer, 
falsely declaring affiliation with the American Cancer Society instead of correctly 
identifying the publicity company.78  This last development resulted in a lawsuit 
and a string of appeals, all of which were resolved against SmokeFree Ohio. 79  
Potential signatories were presented with well-spun data, and SmokeFree Ohio’s 
cavalier use of scientific studies drew fire from a Boston public health professor, 
who found a number of SFO statements “wildly misleading and inaccurate”.80 
The full extent of confusion caused by these contracted signature-
gatherers is impossible to ascertain, but as complaints were filed by both sides, 
courts and agencies attempted to control the damage.  SmokeFree was censured 
for the misrepresentations of its petitioners, and required to file extra signatures. 
After SmokeFree sent an open letter to SmokeLess alleging deception by 
contracted petitioners,81  and subsequently filed a formal complaint to the 
Secretary of State, 82 startlingly overt acts of fraud by SmokeLess petitioners were 
exposed by several county Board of Election inquiries.  The Cuyahoga County 
Board of Elections discovered that 1,122 signatures turned in by a SLO petition 
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circulator appeared to be written in a single hand.83  Later reports turned up dead 
voters’ names on petitions.84  In September, after several counties’ boards of 
elections invalidated fifty-three percent of SmokeLess Ohio’s signatures, the 
group had to come up with 323,000 signatures in ten days to stay on the ballot.85 
 As a Cincinnati political scientist observed, the petitioning process 
suffered from a disturbing lack of “conscientiousness”.86 The constitutional 
requirements for placing the initiatives on the ballot, however, had been satisfied.  
Both groups had marshaled enough signatures to present their proposals to Ohio 
voters for ratification. The two opposing initiatives would be placed on the 




More problems emerged during the balloting stage, as ballot language was 
adopted and campaigning began.  On August 22nd, the Ohio Ballot Board 
rubberstamped language from SmokeLess Ohio which would summarize for Ohio 
voters the proposed constitutional amendment appearing as Issue 4 on the 
November 2006 ballot. The Ballot Board is a five member panel composed of the 
Secretary of State and four other legislators, charged with prescribing ballot 
language on initiative petitions and constitutional amendments.88  In doing so, the 
Ballot board need merely “properly identify the substance of the proposal to be 
voted upon.  The ballot need not contain the full text nor a condensed text of the 
proposal.”89 At the language hearing, which was attended by lobbyists from 
SmokeFree and SmokeLess, the Ballot Board “quickly handled” SmokeLess’s 
proposed language after ruling on language for two other ballot measures, 
allowing SLO to summarize the proposed constitutional amendment as a 
prohibition of, rather than protection for, public smoking.90 The American Cancer 
Society lobby, which argued strenuously for a more honest explanation, was 
furious.91   
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The next day saw a correspondingly low-level review of SmokeFree 
Ohio’s proposed ballot language.92  Their language, which promised a lengthy list 
of exemptions including retail tobacco shops, private clubs, outdoor patios, and 
private residences, was unanimously approved, though the fine print in the 
definitions of the bill effectively undid most of these exemptions.93  For most 
voters, the ballot summaries would be the full extent of engagement with the 
initiatives themselves, but at the close of the hurried hearings, the ballot language 
for the competing proposals failed in both completeness and accuracy to describe 
the bills they purported to summarize. 
As voting day drew nearer, SmokeFree Ohio focused its efforts on 
defeating Issue 4, playing the moral villain card against Big Tobacco.94 Despite a 
significant financial disadvantage (only $1.5 million, to R. J. Reynolds’ $5.3 
million95), the American Cancer Society held the moral high ground.  Editorial 
columnists took up the cause, and letters to the editor revealed public ire over the 
tobacco industry’s role in the proceedings.96 . Indeed, R. J. Reynolds’ grandson 
publicly condemned the profiteering motives of Big Tobacco and urged Ohio 
voters to support Issue 5.97   The villain factor of SmokeLess Ohio’s largest donor 
would be a decisive factor in the ballot results.98 
SmokeLess, for its part, still relied on economic arguments, forecasting 
the loss of Ohio jobs and the closure of bars and restaurants. 99 Despite some 
sympathetic press coverage, these efforts were doomed. Ohioans’ sympathies for 
the profits of the small-business owner were understandably wanting in light of 
the very real public health threat posed by ETS in restaurants and bars.  
Additionally, SmokeFree did an excellent job of exposing faults in the details of 
the ill-conceived constitutional amendment.  In the weeks leading up to the 
election, the tide swiftly turned against Issue 4. In attempting to persuade voters 
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that the economic harms to small businesses outweighed the public health 
concerns of unregulated ETS in all restaurants and bars, SmokeLess was tilting at 
windmills. 
This doomed encounter is best captured in the most direct encounter 
between SmokeFree and SmokeLess: a structured debate between the respective 
lobbyists for Issue 4 and Issue 5.  Hosted by Cleveland’s City Club, a local 
bastion of free speech and civic dialogue, this was the only direct interchange 
between the two opposing lobbies. It captures the most striking features of public 
consideration surrounding the initiatives: lack of inquiry into details of the 
SmokeFree proposal, sustained focus on the deceptive constitutional amendment 
and the villainy of Big Tobacco’s sponsorship, and the hospitality industry’s 
continued reliance on a doomed economic defense.  
Opening for SmokeFree Ohio, Tracy Sabetta acknowledged “a lot of 
confusion in the general public about these two issues” and constructed the case 
for Issue Five around its status as a statute, rather than a constitutional 
amendment.100 This was SmokeFree’s biggest concern – not so much passing the 
initiative, but preventing the passage of Issue Four, which would supersede in the 
event of a joint passage.  Given the startlingly misinformed condition of the Ohio 
electorate, confusion between the two initiatives was a real threat to Issue 5, and 
Sabetta spent the bulk of her time establishing the polarity of the two proposals. 
For SmokeLess, Jason Evans contended that a ban was indeed warranted, 
but “reasonable exemptions” (Evans presented the entire hospitality industry as an 
“exemption”, rather than the target of ETS legislation) were necessary because “a 
total ban ignores the reality that there are places out there that do have smoking 
customers.” Sidestepping the unassailable public health arguments against 
permitting smoking in restaurants and bars, Evans elected to fight his battle on 
publicans’ right to defer to their customers, which was received with audible 
hostility by the audience.    
Sabetta countered by noting that the target of ETS legislation was the 
hundreds of thousands of hospitality workers who had no choice but to suffer ETS 
on the job.  “No-one should have to choose between making a living and 
protecting their health”, she noted, which drew the first and loudest spontaneous 
burst of applause from the audience.  From the placement of applause and the 
nature of the questions (only one question from the audience was directed to 
Sabetta) it was clear that the audience assembled at the City Club Forum favored 
Issue Five. The most enthusiastic audience responses were to Sabetta’s point 
regarding the necessity of protecting workers in bars and restaurants, and her 
indictment of the obfuscatory presence of Big Tobacco, with which she closed: 
                                                 





“R.J. Reynolds is spending millions to try and buy its own page in the Ohio 
constitution.”101 
As voting day drew near, public discussion focused overwhelmingly on 
the necessity of voting down the Big Tobacco creature.102 Because the 
constitutional amendment would trump the legislative proposal if both passed, 
SmokeFree Ohio devoted all of its energy to defeating Issue Four.103 Through the 
exertions of SmokeFree Ohio, voters became aware that they were choosing 
between a ban on smoking and restaurants and bars and a Big Tobacco plot to 
give constitutional protection to their bottom line.  Endorsements rolled in, 
beginning in late September, when Governor Bob Taft gave an unsolicited 
endorsement to the SmokeFree Ohio measure.104   When SmokeFree Ohio 
organized a blowout news conference on October 11th, at which the support of 
Cleveland’s Mayor Frank Jackson was declared, two health commissioners and 
the CEO of the Cleveland Clinic, Toby Cosgrove, spoke in favor of the 
SmokeFree Ohio initiative.105  The Cleveland Clinic’s endorsement was a major 
factor: Cosgrove had issued a series of emails to the 34,000 employees of the 
Cleveland Clinic urging his employees to vote for Issue 5 and against Issue 4, 
contributed $30,000 to the campaign, hung an Issue 5 banner across a major 
traffic artery downtown, and distributed 5,000 yard signs to his employees, 
courtesy of SmokeFree Ohio.106  Each speaker emphasized the importance both of 
voting down Issue 4, the SmokeLess Ohio petition, as well as supporting Issue 5, 
because the constitutional amendment would trump the proposed bill. Speeches, 
naturally, focused on the less than altruistic motives of Big Tobacco, and on the 
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importance of protecting workers in restaurants and bars from secondhand 
smoke.107  
On ballot day, Issue 5 was passed by Ohio voters.  In sum, 58.52% of 
ballots cast supported Issue Five.108  Voter turnout was approximately 56%: of 
Ohio’s 7,860,052 registered voters, only 4,186,207 turned out to the polls on 
November 7.109  In total, 30.15% of registered Ohio voters supported Issue 5, and 
21.37% voted against it.  Issue 4 was more clearly repudiated, receiving only 
35.89% of votes cast.110 
SmokeLess Ohio had chosen a losing battle. In light of the Surgeon 
General’s 2006 report, efforts to preserve smoking in bars and restaurants were 
untenable. Ohioans wanted some form of ETS legislation, and repudiated SLO’s 
increasingly transparent efforts to circumvent meaningful ETS legislation.  In the 
weeks leading up to the election, the major arguments advanced by SmokeLess 
Ohio were thoroughly discredited.   The economic arguments had been seriously 
undercut by studies showing that smoking bans had no effect on restaurants and 
bars in other states.111 The notion that separate smoking sections could 
satisfactorily mitigate ETS in restaurants had been comprehensibly dismissed by a 
study released a week before the election. 112 The preemptive power of the 
constitutional amendment worried voters as well, concerned that municipal clean 
air acts would be undone.113 
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The well-publicized presence of Big Tobacco, compounded by its 
deceptive tactics, had been a major and perhaps decisive factor.114  Certainly 
“voters were put off by the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. sponsorship of the 
amendment.”115 One paper characterized the victory as due in large part to 
SmokeFree Ohio’s “attacking what it claimed was a big-tobacco campaign to 
deceive Ohio voters”.116  Forced to choose between a ban which prevented the 
indisputably devastating effects of ETS in bars and restaurants, and a ploy by Big 
Tobacco to “make it unconstitutional to protect half a million Ohioans employed 
in the hospitality industry from secondhand smoke”117, voters naturally chose the 
former.   
In the midst of this furor, no meaningful examination of the SmokeFree 
proposal had transpired.  Private clubs were never discussed. Cigar and hookah 
bars were never mentioned. The mechanics of the bill’s patio exemption were not 
enquired into.  Throughout the public discussion leading up to the election, the 
only issues to arise were the economic doomsday predictions delivered by Big 
Tobacco and the hospitality industry, and the trenchant arguments for a ban which 
actually functioned as such from SmokeFree Ohio.  Voters believed that they 
were voting for a bill which would “restrict smoking in places of employment and 
in most public places”,118 under which “servers and bartenders would be protected 
from the ill effects of secondhand smoke”119, preserving “reasonable 
exclusions”120 that “legislators can tweak…if necessary”.121  Throughout, 
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Ohioans were stunned to discover what had been voted into law.122   
Within two weeks, a blistering opinion piece by a local professor of law appeared 
in the Cleveland Plain Dealer.  Addressing the electorate, Professor Forte revealed 
the the functional non-existence of the promised exemptions, highlighting the 
stark disjuncture between what voters had been led to expect, and what the text of 
the bill provided for. Noting the general belief by those who voted for it that Issue 
5 was “a ban on smoking in public places, with some reasonable exceptions”, 
Professor Forte explained that “[w]hat you are getting is not what you voted 
for.“123 
The disingenuous exemption scheme of the bill was finally revealed, and 
the voting public was blindsided.  Confusion was rampant – a Cleveland doctor 
who voted for the ban told a reporter that “it didn’t occur to him” that the hookah 
bar he frequented was a target of the legislation.124 As Forte explained, the 
“reasonable exceptions” promised in the ballot summary of the bill were 
functionally nonexistent.  Each category had been defined out of existence. Many 
private clubs, largely veterans’ organizations and charitable societies, retained a 
designated room in which members could smoke.  However, to satisfy the 
statutory definition, a private club could have no employees – defined extremely 
broadly by the statute as anyone providing any service, paid or unpaid.125  Thus, a 
private club simply could not operate – anyone pouring a drink, serving as club 
secretary, or turning out the lights would be an “employee”. Furthermore, the club 
was to be located in a free-standing, wholly-owned building, and could not permit 
guests.126  As Ohio courts would later observe, under this definition, no private 
clubs had ever existed. The definition of outdoor patios, also exempted on the 
summary of the bill, was equally clever. No door could connect a restaurant to its 
patio.127 To meet the definition of a retail tobacco shop, also exempted de jure, a 
business had to be the sole occupant of a free-standing building – a circumstantial 
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requirement violently at odds with general business practice.128  A little-known 
and poorly thought-through element of the bill, requiring “smoking prohibited” 
signs large or numerous enough to be visible everywhere in the space to be posted 
“in every public place and place of employment”, would create unprecedented 
visual pollution.129   
Forte’s piece effectively captures the sense of betrayal felt by supporters 
of the measure.  “With so many important issues on the ballot, many of us did not 
read the lengthy statute itself. Instead, we relied on the good faith of those who 
summarized the law for us. That good faith was misplaced. . . . The fact is that we 
did not vote for a reasonable limitation on smoking on Nov. 7. Without knowing 
it, we voted for a lie.”130 
Indeed, the broad strokes of the Smoke Free Workplace Act were clear – 
no smoking in restaurants and bars – but implementation details and the 
exemption scheme were opaque even to the state agency responsible for putting 
the new law into effect.  The bill was insufficient within its four corners to give 
guidance to the Ohio Department of Health enforcement officers. Responding to 
confusion and frustration, a spokesman demurred that “[we] didn’t write it”,131 
and another noted that “we had to play the hand we were dealt.”132 
Two lawsuits challenging the new regime were filed immediately, one by 
a state liquor trade association alleging violation of the state constitution and 
another by an Ohioan alleging unlawful taking, but could not be resolved, because 
the law was insufficiently specific even to evaluate the specious constitutional 
violations alleged by the plaintiffs.133  Accordingly, the Attorney General’s office, 
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through settlement negotiations with the plaintiffs, agreed that the ban would not 
be enforced until specific enforcement rules had been promulgated by the Ohio 
Department of Health, for which task the agency was given six months. 134  
In the meantime, confusion and frustration ruled the day. Restaurateurs 
and bar owners were unable to determine how the ban would affect them, or how 
it would be enforced.135 Hookah bars, inexplicably, received a provisional 
exemption until the Cleveland Health Department figured out what to make of the 
ethnic tradition.136 Stadiums and outdoor concert pavilions wrote to the Attorney 
General seeking compliance advice, to no avail.137  After the state’s non-
enforcement agreement, hard feelings erupted between voluntarily compliant 
establishments and those renegade outposts which still permitted smoking.138 
With an almost offensive degree of naïveté, a suburban mayor demanded 
immediate enforcement of the Ohio Health Director: “Make the rules. It’s not 
rocket science.”139  In the end, all parties had to wait until the Ohio Department of 
Health promulgated the rules which would determine how the statute was to be 
enforced – in essence, to determine what it meant, and how it would operate.   
 
E. ENFORCEMENT RULES 
 
The process by which enforcement rules would be promulgated appeared 
to encourage meaningful public comment on the bill.  Though this process began 
at last to air the defects in the proposed legislation, it compounded the narrow 
interest landscape at petitioning and ballot stages with a new problem, as the 
clashing special interests took this opportunity to advance more aggressive 
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agendas in the guise of “the voters’ intent”, ultimately rebuffing efforts by the 
Department of Health to remedy some of the more misleading definitions. 
On December 20, the Ohio Department of Health posted draft rules on its 
website, and accepted comments until January 11th.  Following that, a thirty-
member “advisory council” comprised of lobbyists from pressure groups and 
business associations would review the comments privately in several meetings 
beginning January 16th.  A public hearing followed, after which a joint committee 
of the General Assembly would have 30 days to review the rules before entry into 
force.140  
The first public hearing before the advisory council on rule promulgation 
was scheduled for 10 AM January 30th at the William Green federal building in 
Columbus.141 On February 27, 2007, another hearing was held in Columbus, and 
bar owners, veterans, and advocacy groups testified on the proposed rules.  The 
ACS sent Tracy Sabetta, and a number of bar owners represented the economic 
interests of the hospitality industry. No variation on the pre-passage arguments 
was evident: business owners complained about “the state infringing on their 
private business rights”, and the American Cancer Society and other health policy 
and advocacy groups reminded the committee that the law was “fully 
constitutional and legal”.142   
For the first time in official channels, however, the deceptive statutory 
language was confronted as the Health Department’s efforts to promulgate 
enforcement guidelines revealed the Trojan nature of the bill.  The state 
commander for Veterans of Foreign Wars of Ohio appeared on behalf of the VFW 
clubs, testifying that voters had been betrayed by the ballot language: “It said 
private clubs were exempt…we were misled.”143 The Department of Health 
responded by proposing new rules which would enable the promised exemption 
for private clubs to operate in practice by amending the definition of “employee” 
to exclude members of the club. As the Health Department’s spokesman observed 
“Many people [at the hearing] pointed to that ballot language and said we voted 
for an exemption for private clubs”144 and “we feel we are more in line with the 
will of the voters having made this change.”145  
                                                 
140 Mike Boyer, Health Department Speeds Up Process, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 5, 2007, at 
15A. 
141 Aaron Marshall, THIS WEEK AT THE STATEHOUSE, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 29, 
2007, at B3.    
142 Liz Long, State’s Rule Makers Hear Debate On Smoking, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb 28, 
2007, at 1B. 
143 Id. 
144 Harlan Spector, Cancer Society Sues; Challenges Smoking in Private Clubs, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, Apr. 19, 2007, at B2. 
145 Dan Horn, Cancer Society Sues Over Smoking Exemption, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 19, 





This was the only substantive change introduced by the new rules. On 
April 16th, the amended rules passed the legislature’s Joint Committee on Agency 
Rule Review, a “little-covered, obscure agency” comprised of 10 state 
legislators.146  The Joint Committee did not have the power to amend the rules, 
but it could strike them down.  As the chairman of the committee pointed out, 
legislators were loathe to touch the bill and its rules.  “I don’t think any members 
of the General Assembly want to change what the voters voted on…”147 Having 
passed the Joint Committee, the rules were slated to enter into force on May 3rd.   
Responding to testimony from voters who took the ballot language at its 
word, the Health Department had given substance to the promised exemption.  
The American Cancer Society, however, having secured passage, no longer 
needed to maintain the façade of reasonableness.  Its lobbyists executed a startling 
volte-face, condemning the exemption promised by their own ballot language as 
“this loophole that skirts the law”.148  Noting that “the revised rules would allow 
private clubs to get an exemption by making their employees members”, ACS and 
American Lung Association lobbyists found the prospect of a meaningful private 
club exemption “contrary to the intent of what voters approved in November”.149 
Arguing that “[t]he will of the voters and the letter of the law is to protect every 
single worker from secondhand smoke” and that “[t]he point of the law was to be 
strong – it provided no loopholes”, the American Cancer Society filed suit in 
Franklin County immediately after the rules had been approved.150   
OLBA found itself allied with its former nemesis: now that the promised 
exemption for private clubs appeared to have substance, restaurants and bars 
feared having to compete with private clubs for customers.151 OLBA, too, 
construed the voters’ intent against the language on the very ballot they adopted: 
their lobbyist (and former SmokeLess lobbyist) Jacob Evans argued that the new 
language “was not at all what was presented to voters.  Private businesses – clubs 
and taverns – should be treated the same as private clubs in regard to the smoking 
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law.”152 In the context of a ban which was presented to voters as including an 
exemption for private clubs while prohibiting smoking in restaurants and bars, 
this is a curious claim.  Nonetheless, because the voters’ intent was an inscrutable 
black box, it could be creatively reconstructed with impunity, even against 
contrary ballot language.  Both OLBA and the ACS would press this claim in 
Ohio trial courts. 
 
F. THE COURTS 
 
 After the health department’s Rules were “final filed” on April 23, 2007, 
litigation began.  The first case to be disposed was a holdover from the previous 
December which had been deferred until the rules were promulgated. This 
constitutional challenge, filed by Buckeye Liquor Permit Holders Association, 
simply rehearsed the economic arguments advanced during the ballot campaigns: 
after a hearing on the request for injunctive relief pending resolution of the 
constitutional claims was held on April 25th, relief was denied at summary 
judgment.153  Rejecting “any invitation to find that the right to smoke in public is 
among those fundamental rights so ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ that 
‘neither liberty or justice would exist if they were sacrificed’”, the court dispensed 
with the plaintiff trade association’s state and federal constitutional arguments, 
and easily found ETS legislation well within the province of the State’s police 
power.154 The court carefully disclaimed any position on the “wisdom” of the 
policy,155 holding that “Absent some warrant in the law, this court is not permitted 
to set aside the will of the people of the State of Ohio as expressed in legislation 
duly enacted under the popular vote provisions of Ohio’s Constitution.”156 This 
was a straightforward application of well-wrought law: as the court noted in a 
lengthy review of similar cases, these constitutional claims have universally 
failed.157  
A more serious legal challenge to the new legislation emerged when 
OLBA filed a lawsuit on April 13th, 2006 alleging that the Ohio Department of 
Health, in giving substance to the private club exemption, had exceeded its 
rulemaking authority. This argument had been raised but not pursued as a void for 
vagueness challenge in Buckeye Liquor Permit Holders.158 OLBA now made it 
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central, alleging that in amending the definitional elements of the private club 
exemption to accord with the ACS’s ballot language, the Department of Health 
exceeded its limited authority to promulgate enforcement rules and entered the 
forbidden territory of lawmaking.   
The lawsuit cut directly to the heart of the problematic enactment process.  
Opening the opinion, Judge Cain’s frustration was evident in his recitation of 
questions which were barred from the scope of his analysis: 
 
Was the ballot language concerning Issue 5, i.e. the SmokeFree Workplace Act 
(“hereinafter the “SmokeFree Act”), presented to the public on November 7, 
2006 misleading? Did the sponsors, promoters and drafters of the SmokeFree Act 
sell it to the public under the presumption of the existence of an exemption that 
was not really there? Did these same sponsors, promoters, and drafters secure the 
votes of the members of various private clubs via the assurance that the 
SmokeFree Act would not cover their establishments?  In short, was the Ohio 
voting public fooled by a ballot issue that purported to be something that it was 
not?  These are all great questions that should be answered.  However, contrary 
to the beliefs of some, these questions have nothing to do with the present case.   
 
This is not a case concerning whether the sponsors, promoters, and drafters of the 
SmokeFree Act and its accompanying ballot language misled the public, or more 
particularly the members of private clubs. This is not a case concerning whether 
the inclusion of the “private club” exemption in the SmokeFree Act was just a 
sham to get more votes.159 
 
The legal issue presented was quite narrow. Did the Department of Health, 
in an effort to give substance to the private club exemption, exceed its rule-
making authority? Because the listed exemption was effectively undone by the 
definitional elements of the bill, Judge Cain found that the text of the bill taken as 
a whole did not did not actually exempt private clubs, and concluded that the 
Department of Health had exceeded its rulemaking authority in giving substance 
to this illusory exemption.   
 
When viewing the above definitions . . . it becomes clear that the “private club” 
exemption found in the SmokeFree Act is an exemption in name alone. It lacks 
all substance. . . . The Court cannot think of a scenario under the SmokeFree Act 
in which the “private club” exemption would actually apply.  Regardless of the 
statements made in R.C. 3794.03(G) that a “private club” exemption exists, no 
such exemption actually does exist.160 
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Reviewing the Health Department’s arguments, Judge Cain was quite 
sympathetic to the agency’s efforts to redefine “employee” in order to give 
substance to the voters’ intent, but ultimately had to follow the legal fiction of 
ballot initiatives and presume that voters had intended every definitional intricacy, 
“regardless of how the ballot language read”. 
 
The Court applauds the efforts of Defendants in attempting to effectuate the will 
of the people.  However, by doing so they have exceeded their rule making 
authority.  The Court cannot determine the intent of individual voters when they 
voted for the SmokeFree Act. This intent cannot be gleaned from the SmokeFree 
Act itself because it provides for both a “private club” exemption and definitions 
that swallow that exemption.  The Court has to presume that the public at large 
knew what they were voting for.  This is regardless of how the ballot language 
read.  As to the ballot language, it is impossible for the Court to poll each and 
every voter who voted for the SmokeFree Act in order to determine if they were 
swayed by the ballot language or the actual language of the SmokeFree Act.  The 
Court cannot poll the public to determine if it was their intent to have a “private 
club” exemption that mirrors the language found in [the ACS statute] or one that 
mirrors the language of [the Department of Health’s rule]. As can be seen, intent 
is impossible to determine in this case and is frankly completely irrelevant to the 
issue presently before the Court.161 
 
This conclusion, however legally clear, was unwelcome from an equitable 
standpoint, and Judge Cain made no attempt to conceal his irritation with the 
misleading statute and his limitable ability to offer equitable relief.  He concluded 
his opinion with “a final thought on this matter”: 
 
 [I]t is not this court that has nullified the “private club” exemption. It is not the 
Ohio Department of Health that has nullified it, nor will the Ohio Department of 
Health be in error by enforcing the smoking ban against private clubs.  This is 
true because from the very beginning there never was a “private club” exemption 
in the SmokeFree Act.  There was an apparition that called itself a “private club” 
exemption, but that exemption did not really did not exist.  It is not within the 
Court’s power to correct this situation.162 
 
The narrative frustration evident in Judge Cain’s opinion speaks to the 
powerlessness of courts, confined by the legal fiction of a ballot initiative, to 
correct the deception and misinformation that can plague interest-group 
politics.163   
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On appeal, Judge Cain’s conclusions were affirmed, bolstered by the 
Court of Appeals’ additional reliance on an interpretative note buried in the text 
of the bill, stipulating that provisions “shall be liberally construed so as to further 
its purposes”.164  The Court of Appeals echoed Judge Cain’s observations on the 
limited role the Ohio courts could play in resolving the deeper issues raised: 
 
Assuming that the SmokeFree Act falls short of providing the exemption 
contemplated by the agency or other groups, any potential change to the 
exemption as enacted would be a matter for the legislature, not the administrative 
agency, to address.165 
 
Thus did the former antagonists, OLBA and ACS, find themselves allied 
in successful opposition to a meaningful private club exemption.  The ACS 
executed a startling volte-face, now that the statute had passed, and seized this 
opportunity to narrow the exemption scheme even further.  OLBA’s jealous 
opposition, on the other hand, was motivated by the improbable argument that 
bars and restaurants would lose business to membership clubs.  Both, however, 
invoked and reimagined the murky “intent” expressed by Ohio voters in directed 
opposition to the newly meaningful exemption.166 Unable to look behind the 
statute, regardless of the immensely problematic circumstances attending its 
passage, the judiciary was powerless to resolve the issues at the root of the Rule 
controversy.  The only way Ohio could remedy its runaway statute was through 
the legislature.   
 
G. THE LEGISLATURE 
 
Even as legislators turned to address the Act’s nebulous exemption 
scheme, meaningful deliberation over the merits and demerits of specific 
exemptions was hamstrung by the vexing question of voters’ intent.    As Judge 
Cain made perfectly clear, the Ohio Department of Health was limited to rule-
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making authority within the textual boundaries of the misleading Act.  The 
legislature, however, knew no such bounds.  Thus, creative reconstruction of 
“voters’ intent” reached a high-water mark as lobbyists flooded hearings with 
testimony, consistently pushing deference to “the will of Ohio voters” to 
discourage serious consideration of particular exemptions.  
Throughout this process, the message pushed by lobbyists and activists 
with the resources to maintain presences at the Columbus statehouse and in local 
government offices was that Ohio voters had intended to enact a bill without 
exemptions, and had intended to foreclose any further exemptions proposed by 
legislators.  Consistently with the ACS’s earlier strategy of limiting the 
deliberative functions of the state legislature, lobbyists paraded the chimerical 




In April, Ohio Senator Schuler introduced Senate Bill 38, proposing a 
theatrical exemption to the Smoke Free Workplace Act. 167 At a hearing on March 
7, 2007, Senator Schuler explained that the “current vague smoking ban 
language” of the Act jeopardized the ability of theaters to acquire the rights to 
produce scores of plays, and proposed an “antidotal” exemption “to allow 
smoking by a performer while performing a theatrical production if smoking is 
integral to, or is directed by the script or other story line of the performance being 
given.”168 The director of the Cincinnati Playhouse testified that, on account of 
the strict licensing clauses proscribing alterations to licensed works, he would not 
be able to produce a number of well-known plays.169  Legislative consideration of 
this exemption seemed appropriate, because directors of non-profit theaters could 
not afford the costly legal fees which would attend First Amendment litigation. 170  
Senator Coughlin, the chairman of the committee before which testimony 
was delivered, the Senate Committee on Health, Human Services, and Aging, 
elected to keep the proposal in committee. He feared that the bill would become 
riddled with exceptions, “many of which I don’t think are legitimate.”171  
Encouragingly, Senator Coughlin evinced a willingness to tackle exemption 
proposals on the merits, acknowledging that “There are some reasonable 
exceptions, and the theatrical one is one that I support”.172  The director of the 
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Cincinnati Playhouse testified to plays that would be affected and language from 
licensing agreements, while one of the Health Commissioners presented a useful 
review of on-point First Amendment cases.173  An actor was invited to 
demonstrate the verisimilitude of a fake cigarette for the committee.174 Anecdotal 
evidence concerning an unpleasant experience at a dramatic production featuring 
a lighted cigarette was presented. The possible abrogation of licensing agreements 
by the use of fake cigarettes was raised, and concern about the artistic integrity of 
productions was aired.  The thoroughness of the hearing is heartening: certainly 
the committee heard sufficient testimony on both sides of the issue to arrive at a 
well-founded conclusion.   
Opposition testimony, however, threatened to derail the hearing.  
Opponents relentlessly maintained the supposed intent of the voters to enact an 
exemptionless ban. Testimony was heard from the health commissioner of Seneca 
County, the health commissioner of Union County, Tracy Sabetta for the 
American Cancer Society, Micah Berman for the Tobacco Public Policy Center at 
Capitol University Law School, Susan Jagers for the American Cancer Society, 
and two actors.  The common thread running throughout this avalanche of opinion 
was the argument that any exemption to the ban was an impermissible abrogation 
of the “will of the voters”. As Tracy Sabetta put it, “our organizations are 
adamantly opposed to opening up the Smoke Free Workplace Act to changes only 
a few short months after its passage. . . . Nearly 60 percent of Ohio voters 
supported this law at the ballot, and legislation such as Senate Bill 38 only invites 
the introduction of amendment that would carve out exemptions for other entities 
and weaken the protections of the Smoke Free Workplace Act.”175  According to 
opposition testimony, “keeping the law strong and giving the voters of this state 
what they want and deserve” necessarily entailed a hands-off policy without 
debate or amendment.176 This tactic will only impoverish the quality of 
deliberation, and encourage the legislature once again to avoid confronting the 
exemption scheme of the juggernaut Act. It can only be hoped that the proposed 




On October 10, 2007, Senator Cates introduced Senate Bill 195, proposing 
to exempt cigar bars and outdoor seating areas of restaurants situated 20 feet away 
from apertures to dining areas. The hearing on this proposal lacked the quality of 
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advocacy and the fullness of information presented with respect to Senate Bill 38, 
while suffering the same reductive obsession with “the voters’ intent”.     
Senate Bill 195 was from the beginning a clumsy effort at a tobacco 
lounge exemption.  Inspired, according to Senator Cates’ testimony, by the 
experience of one of his constituents, the owner of a “cigar bar and grille” which 
had suffered serious financial losses after the ban took effect, the exemption relied 
on the failed economic arguments which had been repudiated at the polls. Indeed, 
“Anthony’s Cigar Bar and Grille” was not, strictly speaking, a cigar bar, but a 
restaurant cum cigar lounge, so the definitional elements of the proposed 
exemption were immensely problematic.  Defining “cigar bar” as an 
establishment containing a sufficiently large “walk-in humidor” with filtration 
systems,177 Senate Bill 195 provided nearly no meaningful guidance as to what 
would constitute a cigar bar, or differentiate it from a bar which sold a few cigars.  
As opponents pointed out, this would open a Pandora’s Box if standard bars and 
restaurants exploited the definitional vagueness.  Micah Berman, executive 
director of the Tobacco Public Policy Center at Capitol University Law School, 
testified to the bill’s “problematic definitions and unclear drafting”, noting that 
“the statute does not require the sale of a single cigar in order for a bar to qualify 
as a “cigar bar”.178  The American Cancer Society sent a lobbyist who made 
substantially the same point, as did the Health Commissioner for Seneca County.   
Testimony in support was given by the proprietor of a large Cincinnati 
nightclub, the owner of the “cigar bar and grille” which inspired the bill, and 
letters from two national trade organizations representing cigar retailers and 
distributors.   Conventional cigar bars were unrepresented – indeed, cigar bar 
owners appear to have been unaware that the hearing was taking place.179  In 
testimony, proponents tilted at the public health windmill – arguing that an 
exemption was justified for cigar bars on largely economic grounds.  Only one 
brief paragraph in Senator Cates’ introduction, and scattered sentences in the 
letters from the trade unions, mentioned the essential difference between cigar 
bars and restaurants, noting the consensual nature of smoking in the former.   
Not surprisingly, the American Cancer Society renewed its claims to 
express the “will of the voters”, opposing any deliberative examination of 
exemptions on the grounds that “opening up the Smoke Free Workplace Act to 
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changes only a few short months after full enforcement began” “only invites the 
introduction of legislation that would carve out exemptions for other entities and 
weaken the protections of the Smoke Free Workplace Act.”180 The ACS lobbyist, 
evidently unacquainted with the deliberative functions of a legislative committee, 
found it “ironic that legislation that allows for the erosion of health protections is 
being considered by the Health Committee”.181  
The chief defect in the testimony, however, was the absence of any debate 
on the merits of exempting cigar bars.  No effort was made to distinguish cigar 
bars from bars which allowed smoking.  Without any such distinction, the 
proposed exemption would certainly seem inconsistent with the larger purpose of 
the ban.  Overtures were made in scattered sections of proponents’ testimony – 
Senator Cates and both trade associations noted that in cigar bars, patrons and 
employees were informed, consenting, and enthusiastic participants – but this line 
of analysis was not pursued, nor was it reflected in the bill’s text.  Rather, the bill 
was motivated by concerns over the “overall decline in sales revenues for 
restaurants and bars.” Senator Cates testified that he was “not here to undermine 
the smoking ban that was passed by the voters”, and was merely advocating “a 
more common-sense approach to this issue”, but by rehearsing the failed 
economic arguments from the balloting phase of the Act, and proposing a 
clumsily drafted and potentially limitless exemption, SB 195 would have radically 
changed the operation of the smoking ban.182  There are excellent arguments both 
for the exemption of cigar bars within the context of ETS legislation, and one 
might think that in proposing such an exemption, some of these cigar-bar specific 
arguments might be pursued. None were, and opposition testimony resoundingly 
condemned the SB 195 on its unworkability alone.  As a result, the bill is likely to 





Ohio voters enacted the Smoke Free Workplace Act by ballot initiative, 
expressing support for legislation that would protect unconsenting individuals 
from exposure to ETS in restaurants, bars, and the workplace.  Reviewing the 
tortured enactment of the Smoke Free Workplace Act, however, the chief 
conclusion is that public deliberation, particularly concerning the exemption 
scheme, was stifled, enabling the American Cancer Society to slide an extremely 
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aggressive ETS bill into law under the noses of Ohio voters. If the Ohio Smoke 
Free Workplace Act ever aspired to represent the considered deliberation of a 
state which supports effective ETS legislation, containing an exemption scheme 
reflecting the reasoned preferences of her citizens, it can only be adjudged a 
monumental failure. 
Though responsibility for the deceptive bill and its illusory exemption 
scheme must ultimately rest with drafters of the legislation, structural aspects of 
direct legislation facilitated this usurpation of citizen authority and exacerbated 
the damage.  Exemption candidates lacked the financial resources of the major 
players, Big Tobacco and the ACS, and were unable to pressure the big players or 
communicate with the voting public.  Strategic drafting by the American Cancer 
Society successfully presented the mirage of a reasonable exemption scheme. 
Ohioans, evidently, were content to rely on assurances of a “reasonable” 
exemption scheme, reading the list of “exempted” areas on the ballot with a 
presumption of good faith, and the knowledge that the legislature could amend the 
bill to work out any unsatisfactory details. 
 Institutional remedies were foreclosed by a stylized understanding of 
ballot initiatives as perfectly representative of voter intent. The Department of 
Health was prevented from giving force to what it concluded, based on the 
testimony of voters at public hearings, to be voter intent, because its authority was 
limited to enforcing the text of the bill.  Courts presumed an unrealistic level of 
voter sophistication, enforcing the definitional language, which few voters read, 
against the ballot language, which most voters read.  The legislature, the only 
institutional actor with the authority to pierce the veil of voter intent and consider 
the issues and exemptions on their merits, was assailed by commands of 
deference to “the will of Ohio voters” as retroactively (and inconsistently) 
explained by the American Cancer Society and the Ohio Licensed Beverage 
Association.  
The Ohio Smoke Free Workplace Act is a case study in the liability of 
ballot initiatives to procedural abuse, and demands remedial legislative attention.  
This was no grassroots proposal, representing the considered deliberation of Ohio 
voters on all interests in play. This proposal was cleverly drafted by a well-funded 
special interest group, qualified for the ballot with purchased signatures and sold 
to Ohio voters without meaningful consideration of the exemption scheme. It can 
only be hoped that enlightened legislators will have the courage to supply the 
deliberation absent from the enactment process – to moderate, as Hamilton aptly 
put it, “the blow mediated by people against themselves.”183 
 
 
                                                 





III. ETS LEGISLATION BY BALLOT INITIATIVE 
 
Plebiscite, n. A popular vote to ascertain the will of the sovereign. 
-Ambrose Bierce184 
 
As the foregoing case study demonstrates, ballot initiatives are a clumsy 
mechanism for instituting ETS regimes.  In reversing the default rule from 
permitting to prohibiting smoking in public, the key question is which areas will 
be exempted. This, as this Part seeks to establish, is precisely the question ballot 
initiatives are most ill-suited to address. 
 The passage of Ohio’s Smoke Free Workplace Act highlights two aspects 
of modern ETS ballot initiatives which prevent meaningful consideration of 
proposed exemptions.  First, the interests most active in ETS disputes 
marginalized the areas directly affected by the details of the ban. Despite 
plausible arguments for exemption, these voices were unrepresented in the public 
conversation.  Second, deception and misinformation cripple meaningful public 
deliberation.  The full extent of the damage is impossible to ascertain, but there 
can be no question that the use of paid signature-gatherers muddled the proposals, 
and that strategic drafting shielded the details of the exemption scheme from 
public scrutiny. 
The ballot initiative is an impermissibly clumsy vehicle for ETS 
legislation for a third reason.  Though the focal point of modern ETS legislation is 
the exemption scheme, which determines where a state chooses to draw the line 
after flipping the default rule, voters on ballot initiatives not only tend to be 
uninformed concerning the exemption provisions, but are constrained to the 
shrink-wrapped package crafted by the drafters of the proposal, unable to indicate 
preferences on discrete points. Thus, though ballots can indicate a support for an 
ETS regime, they cannot capture public opinion on exemption provisions. The 
danger, of course, is that our legal system persists in pretending that they do. 
Ballot initiatives, therefore, are not only clumsy legislative tools for instituting 
responsible ETS legislation; they are uniquely irremediable.   
  
A. POOR INTEREST REPRESENTATION AND CONSTRAINED PUBLIC 
CHOICE 
 
In Ohio, the interest landscape was commanded entirely by voices on 
opposite extremes. On the one side, the American Cancer Society and its affiliates 
pushed a deceptively draconian bill which had been cleverly drafted to eliminate 
smoking in public, even in areas commonly exempted under effective ETS 
regimes. On the other side, the Big Tobacco/hospitality industry junta opposed 
                                                 





meaningful ETS legislation entirely, peddling a constitutional amendment in the 
guise of a smoking ban which would render meaningful ETS legislation 
unconstitutional.  These were the only groups with the financial resources to 
mount ballot proposals, however, leaving voters generally in favor of ETS 
restrictions with an all-or-nothing choice.   
The interests most directly affected by the exemption scheme, like private 
clubs, performing arts centers, hookah bars, cigar bars, and tobacco retailers, were 
marginalized between the major players.  Despite their persuasive claims for 
exemption, plausibly consistent with the larger purpose of ETS legislation, these 
spaces were unable to present their arguments because they lacked the resources 
of the major players. Even if the illusory nature of SmokeFree Ohio’s exemption 
scheme had been apparent during the balloting process, these establishments did 
not have powerful lobbies to represent their unique circumstances. They could not 
pressure SmokeFree Ohio to craft a more meaningful exemption scheme, nor 
could they afford to place a third ETS initiative on the ballot which might offer a 
strong ETS regime with more reasonably drafted exemptions, offering voters a 
chance to express an opinion.  The hospitality industry did not advocate on behalf 
of these fringe establishments, as they presented different circumstances than the 
bars or restaurants targeted by ETS legislation.  Indeed, the dishonorable and 
absolutist opposition efforts of OLBA and Big Tobacco did exemption areas more 
harm than good, inviting inferences of guilt by association. 
Trapped in limbo between the draconian ban and the hospitality industry’s 
doomed total opposition, the exemption areas were incidental casualties of the 
SmokeFree Workplace Act.  They were abandoned by legislators who might have 
spoken for them. They were ignored by voters who took assurances of a 
“reasonable” exemption scheme on faith, or who would rather pass an imperfect 
ETS bill than lose the opportunity because of a few insignificant victims, these 
fringe establishments had no voice in the process.  Rational social choice, 
therefore, was precluded, because the two proposals neither responded to the 
arguments raised by exemption candidates, nor provided voters with any way to 
express opinions on exemptions.   
This impoverished landscape of interests is fairly typical in the context of 
ETS ballot initiatives.  ETS ballot initiatives are sponsored by health advocacy 
groups, which propose quite severe legislation.185  Major players in the tobacco 
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industry have sponsored opposition efforts quite similar to SmokeLess Ohio’s 
constitutional amendment in a number of other initiative contests, and the 
opposition strategies are typically absolute.186 Theatres, shisha cafes, private 
clubs, veterans organizations, and cigar bars, which are relatively scarce to begin 
with, cannot muster enough money to purchase the signatures required to enter 
the contests at the proposal stage, nor purchase enough political speech effectively 
to present their arguments for exemption.  Thus, the clashing titans have no 
incentive to incorporate the concerns of these fringe areas into their proposals.  As 
a result, voters are not called upon to consider the distinctive claims these 
establishments might have for exemption.  
Furthermore, legislative demurral at the proposal stage is fairly common, 
even in states which provide for a legislative once-over. Though perhaps 
politically understandable – no doubt a legislator proposing an exemption would 
be condemned by ACS lobbyists as “pro-smoking”, even if generally supportive 
of the ban – this type of demurral squanders an opportunity to consider arguments 
raised by interests which cannot afford to be heard.   
To a great extent, available options shape results.  Developed as Arrow’s 
Paradox by economists and social choice theorists, this critique observes that 
outcomes can be managed by those able to define the options on the agenda.187 In 
the context of ETS ballot initiatives, the marginalization of the interests most 
directly affected by the exemption scheme invites tyranny by the vocal minority, 
as voters are neither presented with the full array of interests at stake, nor, as we 
will see, able to express preferences on specific points. 
 
B. MISINFORMATION AND DECEPTION 
 
Misinformation and deception exacerbated the considerable problems of 
interest representation during the passage of the Smoke Free Workplace Act. The 
use by both sides of mercenary signature-gathering companies with no particular 
allegiance to the truth clouded the issues at stake throughout the signature-
gathering and balloting stages.  As voting day approached, voters were too busy 
trying to figure out the difference between the two proposals to consider the 
operation of the Smoke Free Workplace Act in any detail. Repudiating Big 
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Tobacco’s effort to purchase a page of the Ohio Constitution consumed public 
attention.   
Strategic drafting by the American Cancer Society had produced a 
remarkably clever bill, the definitions of which undid the promised exemptions.  
Having warned the legislature off of the proposal, the ACS ensured that the 
deceptive drafting would not become apparent until after the bill’s passage. 
Certainly OLBA’s proposed constitutional amendment was as fully a Trojan horse 
as was the Smoke Free Workplace Act, but with less artfully concealed contents.  
When it backfired in spectacular fashion, the credibility of the other, more subtle 
artifice was enhanced. Thus, the finer points of the Smoke Free Workplace Act, 
particularly the illusory exemption scheme, remained concealed from Ohio voters, 
who took ballot language at face value and assurances of reasonable exemptions 
on faith.  
 
PAID SIGNATURE-GATHERERS AND SIMPLISTIC CAMPAIGNING 
 
These twin dangers, misinformation during the signature-gathering and 
advocacy processes, and affirmative deception by strategically drafted legislation, 
are ineluctable features of what has been termed the modern “initiative 
industry”.188   Political scientists have noted the omnipresence of “highly 
professional operations dominated by media consultants who run deceptive or 
simplistic operations” with concern.189 In 1992, the California Commission on 
Campaign Financing published a report on ballot initiatives, observing that 
“Professional signature-gathering firms now boast that they can qualify any 
measure for the ballot (one “guarantees” qualification) if paid enough money for 
cadres of individual signature-gatherers, and their statement is probably true.  Any 
individual, corporation, or organization with approximately $1 million to spend 
can now place any issue on the ballot”. . . . Qualifying an initiative for the 
statewide ballot is thus no longer a measure of general citizen interest as it is a test 
of general fundraising ability.”190  The rising use of paid petition-circulators has 
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created incentives for ruthless and deceptive practices.191 Perhaps the most 
damning evidence is the statement of an immensely successful California petition 
drive manager, Ed Koupal: “Hell no, people don’t ask to read the petition and we 
certainly don’t offer. . . . why try to educate the world when you’re trying to get 
signatures?”192   
Some states have attempted to limit the damage.  Oregon, for example, 
amended its provisions for direct legislation in 1935 “to prohibit paid signature 
collection because of fear that wealthy interests were beginning to subvert the 
initiative process.”193 In 1974, finding that “voters had been misled, in some 
campaigns, about the purpose of the petitions they had signed”, California 
legislators capped early spending on signature-gathering at $10,000 and 
prohibiting certain well-known tactics like the use of “dodger cards” which 
obscure the text of the proposal from the prospective signatory.194 Illinois required 
an extraordinary demonstration of popular support, requiring that 25% of 
registered voters sign a petition for an advisory ballot question.195  
These and other efforts to revive the integrity of the ballot initiative, 
however, have been ruled unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. 196  The 
use of paid signature gatherers remains a constitutionally protected and 
omnipresent aspect of modern ballot initiatives. In the context of ETS regulation, 
where so much hangs on the details of the exemption scheme, this is especially 
worrying.  Misinformation seeded by ambitious signature-gatherers obscures 
potentially significant aspects of the exemption scheme, and gives initiative 
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The threat of strategic drafting is similarly inextricable from modern ballot 
initiatives.  As Jane Schacter has observed, “the direct lawmaking process gives 
powerful leverage to initiative drafters, who are situated to construct a phantom 
popular intent through strategic drafting.”197  Because voters generally rely on the 
ballot summary to form an opinion, strategic drafting of the generally unread full-
text of direct legislation “enables small groups to appropriate the political 
authority of the electorate”.198 Exemption schemes in ETS proposals are 
particularly liable to this phenomenon, both because they tend to be absent from 
the public conversation, but also because the fine points of an exemption’s 
operation requires a sophisticated analysis of the relevant provisions and 
definitions.  As Schacter observes, “The risk of abuse is particularly 
grave…where the ballot measure is so lengthy or complex that legally significant 
details can easily be buried.”199As Ohio voters discovered to their dismay, the 
presence of an exemption entitled “Private Clubs” on the ballot and in the text of 
the initiative provides no guarantee that it will be operational.   
Ballot language is a serious problem in the context of ETS legislation. An 
ETS regime is a complicated series of proposals: though the proposed default rule 
may be fairly easy to understand, the severity of the measure depends on the 
exemption scheme, the details of which are poorly captured by a ballot summary. 
Ballot boards have a powerful incentive to sacrifice completeness for brevity, as 
voters’ attention spans are limited, and ballots can be quite cluttered.  
Furthermore, the process of adopting ballot language relies in large part on the 
good faith of the proponents. Even public hearings, as was unfortunately 
demonstrated in Ohio, provide no guarantee that ballot language will be accurate.   
 
C. THE PROBLEM OF VOTER INTENT 
 
The chief reasons why ETS ballot initiatives poorly able to express the 
considered opinion of the electorate on exemptions are structural.  
 
Interpreting direct legislation results as mandates or expressions of the popular 
will is . . . problematic. One problem is that voters are not permitted to vote on 
alternative bills; another is that voters cannot attempt to amend the proposed 
legislation to make it more acceptable. An additional problem is that voters are 
limited to an affirmative vote, a negative vote, or an abstention. Because of the 
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way in which propositions are worded, voters often must choose the least 
inaccurate expression of their opinion.200 
 
This is not to suggest that ballot results are meaningless. ETS ballot 
initiatives can reveal general support for some form of ETS regime which 
reverses the default rule. In Ohio, the broad policy question was certainly 
apparent: on the one hand, a “smoking ban” which exempted bars and restaurants, 
and on the other, a smoking ban which did not.  Ultimately, the issue at the voting 
booths was whether or not restaurants and bars deserved per se protection from 
clean air legislation. On this point, the voters spoke relatively clearly.201 In voting 
down Issue 4 and adopting Issue 5, Ohio voters denied such protection and 
reversed the default rule on smoking in public places. 
Beyond the default rule, however, ETS ballot initiatives can reveal very 
little about voters’ intent.  This became painfully apparent in Ohio: not only were 
voters unaware of the operation of the exemption scheme, but when it was 
implemented, even voters who supported the initiative repudiated significant 
points. Jane Schacter’s analysis of “the intractable search for popular intent” 
effectively demonstrates that ascribing a single intent to the passage of a ballot 
initiative is even more problematic than in the context of conventional statutes.202  
The problem of intentionality in multi-member deliberative bodies is magnified in 
the context of ballot initiatives, which aggregate “what may be millions of voter 
intentions.”203  Additionally, voters are typically uninformed,204 and strategic 
drafting may hide significant aspects of the proposal.  Thus, “A vote in favor of a 
ballot question will often signify, at best, an electoral judgment on the salient and 
general policies in question”.205  
These problems are particularly acute in the context of ETS ballot 
initiatives, which present one easily-understood, general proposition (whether or 
not to flip the default rule) and a number of discrete, detail-oriented proposals (the 
exemption scheme).  Ballot initiatives can certainly serve as referenda on whether 
a state chooses to switch the default rule, but they cannot express voter intent on 
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D. LIMITED JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
 
Courts, however, adhere to a stylized portrait of direct democracy, and 
ignore these limitations. In Ohio, frustration with this legal pretense suffused 
Judge Cain’s opinion; other courts have registered similar concerns.206 As 
Schacter’s survey of relevant caselaw from 1984 through 1994 demonstrates, 
most courts continue to employ an intentionalist methodology in interpreting 
direct legislation which renders them powerless to correct the grave procedural 
dangers presented by ballot initiatives.  Not only do courts ignore the severe 
deliberative deficiencies which characterize ballot initiatives and “hold the 
legislature and the citizenry to the same standard when interpreting the laws they 
enact”,207 but courts also “invert the informational hierarchy” in searching for 
popular intent, relying almost exclusively on formal sources, such as the text of 
legislation, instead of media sources which more fully express public opinion, 
such as advertisements and the media.208   
Legal scholars have proposed interpretive methodologies which might 
empower courts to align direct legislation more closely with the will of the 
electorate through active interpretation of key provisions.  Julian Eule proposes 
that courts take a “harder look” at ballot initiatives when constititutional rights are 
implicated.209 Schacter proposes a compelling “metademocratic” interpretive 
framework, whereby courts acknowledge the problems inherent in ballot 
initiatives and apply more rigorous judicial oversight accordingly, perhaps 
looking beyond the text of the statute to other sources of public opinion or 
interpreting ballot initiatives as “a general policy directive rather than a vehicle 
for enacting specific rules in complex areas.”210   
Even if adopted, however, these approaches cannot fully remedy the 
deficiencies of ETS legislation by ballot initiative.  Eule’s model, relying on more 
rigorous constitutional analysis, does not apply to ETS regulation, which is quite 
properly within the bounds of a state’s police power.  Schacter’s proposals rely on 
the existence of provisions ripe for interpretation.  Her interpretive model might 
provide Ohio courts with a basis for giving force to the private club exemption, 
but exemption areas which were not drafted into the proposal cannot be 
interpreted into existence ex nihilo. Moreover, the resources required to pursue an 
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interpretative challenge would most likely present exemption areas with an 
insuperable obstacle.  The Ohio lawsuit was brought by the Attorney General’s 
office: if the Department of Health had not attempted remedial action which 
implicated statutory interpretation, private clubs may not have been able to 
contest the provision. Certainly, as testimony from the hearing on the theater 
exemption made clear, performing arts spaces cannot afford litigation, and much 
smaller operations such as cigar bars and hookah bars would be similarly unable 
to contest exemption provisions.   
ETS ballot initiatives are largely judicially irremediable. Interestingly, the 
ultimate remedy has not been formally foreclosed: the Supreme Court has not 
determined whether or not direct legislation is compatible with the Guaranty 
Clause, holding in 1912 that the question was properly for Congress.211  It is clear, 
however, that state constitutions which include such provisions do so at their own 
peril.212  Courts have prevented states from implementing procedural 
requirements which would ameliorate the more egregious abuses of the balloting 
process – the First Amendment precludes limitations on the use of paid petition-
gatherers, or requirements that high percentages of public support be 
demonstrated before a proposal can be certified for the ballot.213 Courts, in short, 
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IV. A PROPOSAL 
 
Wandering between two worlds, one dead 
The other powerless to be born 
-Matthew Arnold214 
 
States have made laudable progress in reversing the default rule on 
smoking in public. Recent years, however, have seen a rising tide of ETS ballot 
initiatives, bearing many of the same worrying features of Ohio’s Smoke Free 
Workplace Act.  Florida’s Clean Air Indoor Act was the first statewide ban passed 
by ballot initiative, in 2002.215  In 2005, the American Cancer Society and its 
affiliates passed Initiative 901 in the state of Washington. In 2006, the American 
Cancer Society and its affiliates passed three bills by statewide ballot—in Ohio, 
Nevada, and Arizona.  These bills are among the most draconian nationwide – 
Washington’s is the most severe, followed closely by Ohio and Arizona.  These 
ballot campaigns were bipolar affairs, pitting legislation drafted by the American 
Cancer Society against competing initiatives supported by hospitality 
organizations and the tobacco industry (or, in the case of Nevada, gambling trade 
associations), and exemption areas were marginalized.   
As the foregoing Part suggests, ballot initiatives are a problematic vehicle 
for ETS legislation. As ETS ballot initiatives proliferate, the need to evaluate and 
possibly amend this legislation becomes increasingly acute.  In this Part, I contend 
that state legislatures must devote specific remedial attention to ETS bills passed 
by ballot initiative. To assist legislators in this task, I propose a balancing test for 
use in evaluating exemption proposals.   
 
A. THE QUESTION OF DEFERENCE 
 
Ballot initiatives are prone to produce bad ETS legislation.  Courts are 
unable to—indeed should not—undertake to make bad law good, and exemption 
schemes present policy questions which implicate neither state nor Federal 
constitutions. Executive agencies are bound to enforce the text of these bills, and 
advocacy groups enthusiastically police their efforts.  Remedial action, therefore, 
is incumbent upon state legislatures, who can supply the deliberation and interest 
representation in proportion to the deficiencies apparent in ballot campaigns.   
In amending exemption schemes, however, legislators are confronted by a 
vexing question of deference.  Though ballot initiatives can only meaningfully 
express a public consensus on reversing the default rule, vested interests pressure 
legislators against amending ETS bills, irresponsibly claiming a popular mandate 
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on specific provisions in the text of the legislation and condemning efforts to 
undermine the ‘intent of voters’. 
Legislators are saddled with an anachronistic view of direct legislation, 
but a glance at how the populist roots of the ballot initiative have been undone by 
the rise of the modern initiative industry should counteract legislative reticence.  
Direct legislation in American states is the product of a particular historical 
moment in which rampant corruption in state legislatures created a siege 
mentality between the electorate and its representatives.  The ballot initiative was 
born in the Midwest and West with the rise of the Populist Party in the last decade 
of the nineteenth century, and spread rapidly to over twenty states in the first 
decades of the twentieth century during the Progressive era.216  Pushed at a grass-
roots level by cause organizations, notably “grange organizations, single-taxers, 
socialists, labor groups, prohibitionists, and evangelists”, this new mechanism 
was introduced to combat the operation of machine politics in legislatures 
dominated by the influence of powerful special interests, notably railroads and 
large industrial corporations.217  
As the twentieth century wore on, however, the professionalization of 
direct legislation subverted the Populist ideal of direct democracy as the grass-
roots expression of an enlightened electorate. In this unanticipated environment, 
“interpreting direct legislation results as mandates or expressions of the ‘popular 
will’”, as the most comprehensive study of voter behavior in ballot initiatives 
concludes, is “problematic”.218 We have already reviewed the excellent work of 
political scientists and legal academic, which has swept the veil from our 
deformed descendent of direct democracy’s early ideal.  We know quite well that 
ballot initiatives cannot reveal intent on legislative niceties. Legislative deference 
to exemption provisions on the theory that they represent the specific intent of 
voters is either little more than self-indulgent sloth, or little less than cowardice.  
Legislators may also be cowed into silence by political pressure.  
Legislators are loathe to disturb ETS legislation, fearing the political 
consequences of running afoul of the special interest groups keen to reconstruct 
the “intent” of the legislation and incurring charges of abrogating the will of the 
people.  
Given the inability of ballot initiatives to express popular will on discrete, 
specific points, however, and the particular liability of ETS ballot initiatives to 
procedural concerns, legislators should not be shamed by a stylized portrait of 
                                                 
216 See generally MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION (1984); THOMAS CRONIN, DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989); SHAUN BOWLER 
ET AL., CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (1998). 
217 Shaun Bowler and Caroline Donovan, An Overview of Direct Democracy in the American 
States, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 12 (Bowler 
et al., eds., 1998). 





direct legislation into deference to specific exemption provisions.  Rather, 
legislators should take up the gauntlet and examine the exemption schemes of 
ballot initiatives directly. As Madison put it in Federalist 10, representative 
governments should serve “to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing 
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best 
discern the true interest of their country.”219 To do otherwise is to become 
complicit in what Schacter has accurately described as the “appropriat[ion]” of 
political authority by well-funded but unrepresentative interest groups. 
 
B. A BALANCING TEST FOR EXEMPTIONS 
 
Legislators, however, are presently ill-equipped to analyze the exemption 
areas. The pluralist ideal of comprehensive interest representation has failed in the 
context of ETS legislation, and debates concerning proper exemptions have been 
crippled by extremism.  The interests well-funded enough to exert significant 
pressure on legislators or influence the adoption process – hospitality trade 
organizations, Big Tobacco, and advocacy groups – recreate the problem of 
interest representation at legislative hearings on proposed exemptions, and revive 
a pernicious obsession with “voter intent”. As a result, perspectives which should 
be considered in the context of exemption schemes, or moderate arguments for 
the narrow tailoring of ETS legislation, may be shouted over.   
The secondary literature currently available is similarly impoverished by 
polarization and unlikely to assist legislators in considering proposed exemptions. 
On the one hand, critics of ETS legislation tend towards libertarian zealotry, 
opposing ETS legislation in principle instead of encouraging moderation 
compatible with the larger aims of ETS legislation.220  Proponents, on the other 
hand, tend to be equally immoderate, and push well beyond the purview of 
responsible ETS legislation.  No study which supports ETS legislation but 
demands closer attentiveness to the exemption schemes has yet emerged.  
Legislators need both courage to address ETS exemption schemes, and the 
analytical tools with which to do so effectively.  I believe that a balancing test will 
assist legislators on both fronts. Emboldened by reliance on a neutral analytical 
tool, tailored specifically to address documented deficiencies inherent in ETS 
ballot initiatives while remaining compatible with the function of an effective 
ETS regime, legislators may be more willing to revisit the legislation.  Focusing 
attention specifically on the merits of particular exemptions in the context of a 
rational, coherent, and narrowly tailored ETS regime, such a balancing test would 
provide clarity amidst the fanciful ex post reconstructions of special interest 
lobbyists and enable specific exemption areas to be considered on their merits. 
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Accordingly, I propose the following test for use in considering proposed 
exemptions to ETS regimes.  On the one side of the scale lies the extent to which 
the proposed exemption area offends the essential purpose of ETS legislation – to 
eliminate involuntary exposure to second-hand smoke in public.  On the other 
side of the scale lie any virtue defenses the proposed area may have to offer. If the 
virtues outweigh the vice, exemption is proper. 
In asking legislators to examine the extent to which a proposed exemption 
area offends the purpose of ETS legislation, the first prong of the balancing test 
foregrounds the fact that exemption candidates may offend the function of ETS 
legislation in different degrees and different ways, and may warrant 
correspondingly greater or lesser degrees of state intrusion.  The actor smoking a 
cigarette onstage presents a different circumstance than the veteran who smokes 
in his room at the nursing home, and an Egyptian native’s desire to smoke hookah 
at a neighborhood shisha café may be distinguished from a diner’s desire to have 
a cigarette after a meal in a crowded restaurant populated by smokers and 
nonsmokers alike. The police power of a State is a powerful tool, and should be 
used with reserve and precision.  As Part I demonstrates, a number of different 
conclusions may be possible on the extent to which these areas warrant 
exemption.  The choice of exemptions represents a judgment on the severity of an 
ETS regime, a judgment ballot initiatives cannot express, and a judgment prone to 
distortion by vocal interest groups. In focusing legislative attention on the precise 
degree to which an exemption candidate may offend the statutory purpose, this 
prong requires states which choose to institute extremely severe regimes confront 
the variable ways in which exemption areas offend the function of ETS 
legislation. Exemptions should, after all, be narrowly tailored within the context 
of an ETS regime and neither undermine its essential function, nor outstrip it.   
The second prong of our balancing test requires an evaluation of any 
virtues the proposed area may offer society – the reasons it warrants exemption.  
This “virtue defense” prong provides for the aggregation of “soft” factors which 
lie between the twin poles of health advocacy groups and their libertarian 
opponents to be considered.  Legislating the public health bears consequences in 
several different areas of concern to the state, which may lack a designated 
scholarly niche or mobilized pressure groups. As will be developed infra, public 
health measures can have significant effects on core elements of our democracy. 
The vitality of cultural institutions, local traditions, artistic liberty, community 
life, and other pragmatic concerns may all play different roles in how a particular 
state might consider exemption areas, and this prong provides legislators with a 
way precisely to account for these inchoate factors against the extent to which 





Significantly, this second prong avoids the conventional deliberative 
stalemate of ETS ballot initiatives.  Autonomy arguments are characteristically 
intractable, and in the context of ETS legislation, must be subordinated to the 
public health function of the regime.  Some exemption areas, however, pose little 
or no threat to the function of an effective ETS regime. By reframing the question 
from the usual balancing of autonomy concerns against public health benefits, to 
an analysis which accepts the necessity of reversing the default but focuses on the 
exemption scheme, this second prong enables legislators to measure the precise 
degree to which a given area offends the statutory purpose directly against the 
virtues of exemption without succumbing to the binary stalemate to which ETS 







































V. TOBACCO LOUNGES 
 
It is our task not to complain or condone but only to understand. 
-Georg Simmel221 
  
To illustrate the operation of the balancing test proposed above, Part V 
demonstrates its application to an exemption area which appears in many 
statewide ETS regimes, the tobacco lounge.  As we have seen, some states 
provide tobacco lounges with a permanent per se exemption, generally defining 
the establishments as those which derive a large percentage of revenue from the 
on-site sale of tobacco products.  Others include a limited grandfather clause 
exemption for cigar bars, unwilling to countenance immediate destruction of local 
or cultural landmarks, or perhaps unwilling to provide proprietors of existing 
tobacco lounges with the incentive to raise strenuous and perhaps compelling 
objections.  Finally, Class V regimes simply prohibit the operation of tobacco 
lounges altogether.  Conceptual boundaries, however, are not always neatly 
drawn, leading to confused implementations of exemptions relating to tobacco 
lounges.  Some states preserve a retail exemption, but not a cigar bar exemption, 
so retailers have begun to construct smoking lounges to provide a home for 
vagrant regulars of disestablished cigar bars.222 Some states exempt hookah bars, 
but not cigar bars, and others have done the opposite.  These uncompromising 
ETS regimes have produced “smokeasies”, or underground smoking bars, in 
many cities.223   
Some of the confusion can be attributed to the fact that tobacco lounges, a 
rare species of public establishment, are poorly understood.  Legislators may lack 
familiarity with cigar bars. Additionally, many shisha cafes and hookah bars are 
cultural outposts in ethnic enclaves which interface infrequently or ineffectively 
with the machinery of state and local government.  As a result, tobacco lounges 
are often analytically undifferentiated from conventional bars and cafes, the 
primary target of ETS legislation. 
Furthermore, tobacco lounges rarely have informed advocates who can 
effectively assess their proper place within ETS regimes. Comprising a tiny slice 
of hospitality markets, and unrepresented by specific lobbies or activist groups, 
these establishments must rely on membership in licensed beverage associations 
                                                 
221 Georg Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental Life (1903), in GEORG SIMMEL ON INDIVIDUALITY 
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which take a much more absolutist and oppositional approach than is appropriate 
in the context of tobacco lounges.  General hospitality lobbies have no interest in 
demonstrating the unique circumstances of such a narrow interest, however 
compelling, for to do so would be to undercut their more sweeping, industry-wide 
opposition to the proposals. Indeed, it can be far easier for legislators to ignore the 
conceptual difficulties posed by tobacco bars than it is to tailor legislation closely 
to their circumstances within an ETS regime. Under these circumstances, the 
application of our balancing test to the tobacco lounge exemption is especially 
warranted.  
The application of this test will aid legislators in isolating the merits and 
demerits of the tobacco lounge exemption. Additionally, the test will also aid 
legislators in evaluating different types of tobacco bar exemptions, a function 
particularly useful given the panoply of available exemption mechanisms.  
In this section, then, I apply the balancing test in detail to tobacco bar 
exemptions.  I begin by establishing portraits of the two most common types of 
tobacco lounges. Then I consider the extent to which tobacco lounges infringe the 
statutory purpose of ETS legislation, and evaluate virtue defenses tobacco lounges 
may offer.  After weighing these two prongs, I proceed to evaluate different 
tobacco bar exemption mechanisms in the context of the virtues and vices 
illuminated by the balancing test. Finally, I propose a new mechanism for the 
exemption of tobacco lounges within the context of effective ETS legislation.    
 
A. SHISHA CAFES AND CIGAR BARS 
 
There are two types of tobacco lounge: the cigar bar, and the shisha café 
or hookah bar. The hookah bar, a modern descendent of the traditional Middle 
Eastern coffee house, is a small café  in which patrons gather to drink coffees or 
teas and smoke shisha, a fruit-flavored tobacco, through an elaborate, stationary 
water-pipe called a hookah or nargile.224 Typically owned by Yemeni, 
Moroccans, Egyptians, and other Arab nationals, shisha cafes function as cultural 
centers in traditionally Middle Eastern enclaves in major cities.225 Smoking a 
                                                 
224 James Grehan, Smoking and Early Modern Sociability: The Great Tobacco Debate in the 
Ottoman Middle East, AM. HIST. REV. 1352, 1356 (Dec. 2006) (“First popularized in Inda and Iran 
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Middle East.”) 
225 Bill Werde, NEW YORK SMOKING; A Sad Ballad for the Water-Pipe Cafes of Astoria, N.Y. 
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hookah takes between forty minutes and two hours.226 Increasingly, college 
students have become occasional patrons of hookah bars.227 Patrons gather at 
hookah bars for shisha, culture, and camaraderie, finding hookah bars uniquely 
conducive to public sociability.228  
The cigar bar is a similarly small operation in which patrons gather 
primarily to smoke cigars.  An intimate establishment with few employees—
typically a bartender or barista, and a cigar expert—cigar bars function as local 
gathering places in urban areas. Unlike shisha cafes, cigar bars are often licensed 
premises, serving cocktails and liquors in the evenings, though during the 
afternoons many serve espresso drinks. Beverages, however, are a peripheral 
complement to the primary item sold at cigar bars, the cigar. Cigar bars sell only 
so-called “premium” cigars, or hand-rolled cigars consisting of long-leaf tobacco 
made by family-owned companies in Honduras, Nicaragua, or the Dominican 
Republic.229  Sold for consumption on the premises, premium cigars are stored in 
large wall-mounted humidors, and some cigar bars rent out “lockers”, or small 
humidors in the wall, in which regular patrons can keep their favorite cigars.   
                                                 
226 Kandela, Nargile Smoking, (Distinguishing nargiles – “which take at least an hour to finish” 
and “are for people who want to ‘get away from it all’ and have a ‘philosophical’ discussion” – 
from cigarettes – which are “for busy people who are always on the move”). For a detailed 
description of the operation of a shisha pipe, see Sebnem Timur, The Eastern Way of 
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227 Tamar Lewin, Collegians Smoking Hookahs…Filled With Tobacco,  N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 
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228 Peter Kandela, Nargile Smoking Keeps Arabs in Wonderland, THE LANCET vol. 356, p. 1175 
September 30, 2000 (“In traditional Arab society…the nargile signifies a social occasion in which 
everyone can participate”); Kilgannon, Cultural History (Quoting patron: “Smoking [shisha] 
brings our people together.”); Werde, Sad Ballad  (quoting patron: “people come to these cafes to 
sit with friends and smoke shisha.”). 
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advocates who have targeted a rise in “cigar” smoking among urban youth, in recent years, as part 
of a call for stricter measures. Incredibly, the NCI monograph fails to differentiate,  except to note 
that these “blunts” accounted for over 60% of cigar sales. Premium cigars accounted for 6.5%. 
NCI Monograph at 52.  In the context of cigar bars, this could not be more misleading.  These 
studies conflate what most cigar smokers would call a cigar with flavored, slightly outsized 
cigarettes, often padded internally with “filler” cardboard and chemicals.  Big Tobacco is 
responsible for these, with high-selling brands such as Philly Blunts and Swisher Sweets, 
designating them “cigars” simply to evade the stricter ingredient disclosure requirements triggered 
by a “cigarette” label. However, these “blunts” are no more cigars than were the brown, cigarette-
sized “little cigars” marketed by Big Tobacco in the 1970s to evade television cigarette advertising 
regulations.  See Cristine D. Delnevo, “A Whole ‘Nother Smoke” or a Cigarette in Disguise: How 
R.J. Reynolds Reframed the Image of Little Cigars, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Aug. 2007. See also 
David Satcher, Cigars and Public Health,  340 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1829-1831.  In failing to 





Cigar bars generally install the most sophisticated ventilation systems on the 
market.    Even in states which exempt cigar bars, there are never more than a few 
per city – major metropolitan areas may have as many as five,230 where smaller 
cities will have fewer231 and towns and villages rarely have such establishments.    
Patrons come to cigar bars primarily to smoke premium cigars.232  
Smoking a premium cigar takes between thirty and sixty minutes, and cigar 
smokers treat cigars more like a fine wine than a cheap beer, preferring tobaccos 
from different soils, regions, and different curing processes.233  Cigar smokers 
tend overwhelmingly to be “occasional” smokers, enjoying cigars infrequently.234 
An evening at a cigar bar tends to be a social occasion, and cigar smokers gather 
at cigar bars for an evening of conversation. Indeed, proprietors of cigar bars 
pride themselves on the conversational and civil character of their destinations.  
Décor is structured accordingly: couches and clusters of armchairs are the essence 
of traditional cigar bar décor. Chess tables are a common fixture. Despite the 
well-known stereotype of cigar smoking as an activity practiced by rich white 
males on Wall Street,235 cigar smoking is increasingly gender-balanced236 and 
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using cigars reported smoking them “some days” (98%) rather than “every day” (2%).”); 
Appendix C. 
235 See, e.g., WALL STREET (Amercent Films, 1987) (Main character curries favor with Wall Street 
tycoon Gordon Gekko by delivering a box of Cuban cigars). 
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doubled between 1993 and 2000. Nyman et al, supra note 234 at 26. Indeed, third-wave feminists 
have been described as  “likely to be found at the ‘local cigar bar’”. Jennifer Purvis, Grrrls and 





socioeconomically diverse237 and proprietors pride themselves on 
inclusiveness.238  
 
B. CONTRAVENTION OF STATUTORY INTENT? 
 
The first prong of test provides an opportunity to consider the specific 
circumstances of tobacco bars, divorced from imperfect analogies to conventional 
bars and cafes. Tobacco lounges interface differently with the intent of modern 
ETS legislation, but these differences are often elided. The purpose of ETS 
legislation is to prevent involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke.   As tobacco 
lounges are patronized exclusively by consensual smokers, concerns which attach 
to restaurants and bars simply fail to apply.  It would be superfluous to belabor 
this point, but its simplicity should not undo its force: the primary justification for 
ETS legislation does not apply to tobacco lounges.     
By reversing the default rule, modern statewide bans moot the “captive 
employee” problem to which hospitality workers were once subject.  The 
assignation of this problem to tobacco lounges has always been somewhat 
unpersuasive. First, they are numerically scarce, making it far easier to get a job at 
a conventional restaurant or bar than at a rare specialist shop with few employees.  
Second, employees are largely self-selecting: bartenders often choose to work at 
tobacco bars, instead of the far more numerous bars and restaurants, because of an 
interest in the product.  Personnel managers, in fact, screen non-smokers for an 
eminently practical reason: employees uncomfortable in smoky environments will 
likely be ineffective bartenders in tobacco lounges. In the context of the new 
default rule created by ETS legislation, however, the “captive employee” 
argument becomes wholly inapposite.  Jobs in tobacco lounges, already scarce 
and selective for bartenders and baristas who have an interest in shisha or cigars, 
are coveted by bartenders with smoking habits.   
So do tobacco lounges offend the statutory intent of statewide ETS 
legislation? Simply put, they do not. Patrons actively consent, entering tobacco 
lounges for the purpose of smoking.  As ETS legislation flips the default in the 
hospitality industry from smoking to non-smoking, jobs at the few tobacco 
lounges in major metropolitan market become increasingly competitive, and 
                                                                                                                                     
NATIONAL WOMEN’S STUDIES ASSOCIATION JOURNAL (Fall 2004) at 96.  See also Michael S. 
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237 Though Gilpin and Pierce characterized cigar smokers in 1996 as “predominately male, 
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dramatic increases in percentages of cigar-smoking populations were documented among 
Hispanics and African-Americans, and the lower surveyed income brackets (under $20,000 and 
between $20,000 and $50,000).  Gilpin and Pierce, supra note 236. See Also Appendix C. 





already dubious concerns about employee coercion disappear. In fact, recent 
studies suggest that preserving a few public places where smokers can enjoy a 
cigar or hookah with friends away from the home might actually further the 
purposes of ETS legislation: economists have found that smokers are smoking 
more frequently at home after restrictive ETS legislation is passed.239  In sum, the 
operation of a tobacco lounge fails to expose unconsenting individuals to second-
hand smoke in public, and does not offend the statutory intent of modern ETS 
legislation. 
 
C. VIRTUE DEFENSE 
 
Poorly understood and unrepresented by specific lobbies, the civic virtues 
peculiar to cigar bars and shisha cafes have gone largely unacknowledged.  
Though the economic arguments unsuccessfully raised by restaurants and bars in 
opposition to ETS legislation obtain with unique force in the context of tobacco 
lounges, no affirmative reason for exemption has been heard.  In applying the 
second prong of our balancing test to tobacco lounges, the distinctive and 
important social role served by these establishments can be accounted for, and an 
unintended casualty of ETS legislation can perhaps be preserved. Furthermore, 
understanding the virtues of cigar bars and shisha cafes will assist legislators and 
health department officials in tailoring exemptions to ensure that only deserving 
tobacco lounges secure exemptions.   
The proposition that public spaces which promote social exchange 
between members of society play a vital role in a healthy democracy is neither 
novel nor daring.  Sociologists and political scientists have spilled a great deal of 
ink on this idea, pursuing influential conceptualizations such as Habermas’s 
“public sphere”240 and Arendt’s “public realm”.241  Crudely generalizing, these 
theses demonstrate the ways in which publicness, particularly in the form of 
public interactions between individuals which promote the forming of social ties 
and the exchange of ideas and perspectives, bolsters healthy political community 
in a democracy by providing an arena where public opinion can be formed, 
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promoting interaction with and understanding of different perspectives, and 
encouraging civic engagement and mobilization. 
An equivalent wealth of attention has been devoted to diagnosing what 
emerges as a chief feature of the twentieth century – the erosion of publicness and 
the disintegration of civic community.  Habermas and Arendt foreground these 
concerns in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and The Human 
Condition; similar analyses have followed in their footsteps.242  The immediacy of 
these concerns for present-day America has been highlighted by Robert Putnam in 
his sweeping study of American community and civic engagement, Bowling 
Alone.  Bringing a remarkable body of statistical evidence to bear, Putnam paints 
a disturbing picture of “the decimation of American community life”.243  By all 
available markers, every form of community involvement has receded,244 political 
participation has plummeted,245 and informal social connectedness has 
collapsed.246  Americans are increasingly unlikely to meet new people, make new 
friends, are prone to stay at home in the evenings, and are loath to participate 
meaningfully in civic organizations or politics.247 This disappearance of “social 
capital” has, Putnam argues, has severely undermined the health of our 
democracy.248 
The effects of this phenomenon are particularly stark in cities. Social 
theorists have long observed the unique predisposition of urban life to erode 
community ties – the German sociologist Georg Simmel’s important early 
observations in “The Metropolis and Mental Life” of the blasé attitude, the 
‘privilege of suspicion’ and public reserve, and the atmosphere of individuated 
isolation as essential elements of life in the modern metropolis, have been 
sustained throughout the twentieth century.249  Recently, the call has been raised 
for renewed attention to the effects of the character of urban life on the health of 
American democracy.250 
These trends throw the virtues of tobacco lounges into sharp relief.  Given 
the importance of the public sphere, and its striking recession, public places 
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conducive to its expression assume heightened importance.  Habermas located the 
inception of the public sphere in the English coffee houses of the eighteenth 
century – those cheery places, conceptually situated between the privacy of the 
home and the formal publicness of state affairs, where patrons gathered to drink a 
“dish” of coffee, smoke a tobacco-pipe, and discuss affairs of common concern. 
The aristocracy was brought face-to-face with “intellectuals of the middling sort”, 
and conversation was grounded by the literary and political pamphlets strewn 
about the coffee houses. By this measure, “something approaching public 
opinion” without the artifice of state was produced.  The finer points of 
Habermas’ description of the eighteenth-century English coffee house has been 
picked at by historians for its descriptive accuracy, but, as has been observed, his 
articulation of the virtues inherent in these places is better understood as 
comprising a normative claim for their value.251   
The coffee-house has long served as the paradigm-setting anchor for a 
vibrant public sphere.252 In modern times, an analogue to these observations on 
the role of the English coffee houses has been introduced by Ray Oldenberg, who 
finds particular value in what he calls “the third place”, or those places where 
informal conversation and interaction arises between non-intimates in public.253 In 
The Great Good Place, Oldenberg makes a case for a similar role played by 
modern-day coffee shops, 254 but as the leading scholar of coffee-houses has 
observed, “in their ubiquity, and uniformity, the branded coffee-shops also seem 
to reinforce the feelings of emptiness and alienation caused by modern life.”255 
Local, independent coffee-houses may function analogously to the English coffee-
houses of old, sponsoring book discussions, reading groups, and distributing local 
pamphlets and bulletins, but the dominance of branded chains and an oppressive 
to-go mentality have increasingly eroded the ability of modern-day coffee shops 
effectively to discharge the expectations of their archetype.   
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252 The nineteenth-century English social historian Leslie Stephen identified the community of 
opinions created within the coffee houses as “the town”, or “the literary organ of society”. In 
1913, Harold Victor Routh explored the role of the coffee-house in the social fabric of the 
metropolis, crediting these places with creating new affinities between members of different social 
classes. In the 1930s, the inescapable social historian George Macaulay Trevelyan echoed these 
conclusions and eulogized the role played by coffee houses in shoring up democratic liberties: 
“The ‘universal liberty of speech of the English nation’ uttered amid clouds of tobacco smoke, 
with equal vehemence whether against the Government or the Church, or against their enemies, 
had long been the wonder of foreigners; it was the quintessence of Coffee House life.” Just before 
Habermas began his post-doctoral dissertation, the sociologist Hans Speier observed the vital role 
played by the English coffee-houses in “forg[ing] the prominent role of public opinion in 
democratic politics.” See generally id. at xvii-xxiv (Reviewing historiography of coffee house 
culture). 
253 Ramon Oldenberg and Dennis Brisset, The Third Place, J. QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY (1982).  
254 RAY OLDENBERG, THE GREAT GOOD PLACE (1999). 





Tobacco lounges in modern cities, however, have taken up the role 
attributed to the early coffee-houses and abandoned by their modern, branded 
counterparts. Indeed, Habermas’ typology of the elements which made coffee-
houses such exemplary foci for the public sphere applies neatly to tobacco 
lounges.256 Tobacco lounges, to a greater or lesser degree, contain the essential 
elements of the coffee houses Habermas found so crucial to the public sphere: 
conducive to an unfettered range of debate and conversation, relatively non-
hierarchical, and accessible and inclusive.  
First, and most importantly, tobacco lounges are centers of public 
conversation.  This is partially inherent in the nature of the product – patrons 
associate the cigar or hookah with conversation, and their expectations shape 
social interactions at tobacco lounges.257 Indeed, in both cases, the product is 
extremely conducive to conversation – a premium cigar or a shisha pipe takes a 
relatively long time to smoke, creating a situational stability which encourages 
longer and more in-depth discussions.  Additionally, conversations frequently 
spring up between complete strangers who share this common interest.258  As 
tobacco lounges constitute a “niche” market, the shared interest in cigars or shisha 
is far more facilitative of informal social interactions between non-intimates than 
the default affinity for libations shared by patrons of conventional bars.  Evidence 
can be found all over the Internet: as ETS legislation eliminates local tobacco 
lounges, a rich online community of cigar enthusiasts has grown up in chat rooms 
and discussion boards, seeking to recreate online the conversations which have 
been prohibited in public.259 
The traditionally conversational character of tobacco lounges drives is 
reinforced by structural and operational features.  Unlike conventional bars, 
tobacco lounges remain open during the daytime hours, and the atmosphere 
during daytime hours is even more conversational. Indeed, patrons of tobacco 
lounges become irritated when their local institutions become more like 
conventional bars, increasing volume levels and patron density.260 The physical 
arrangement of tobacco lounges promotes relaxed conviviality – ottomans, lounge 
chairs, and small tables are the norm, instead of standing-room cocktail tables or a 
                                                 
256 Markman Ellis characterizes these elements as (1) non-hierarchical, (2) encouraging an 
unfettered range of debate and conversation, and (3) accessible and inclusive. Id. at xv.   
257 See LaTour, supra note 236; Appendix C.  
258 45% of survey respondents at the Owl Shop reported conversing “often” with new people; 41% 
reported doing so “sometimes”. See Appendix C. 
259 A thriving online community of cigar-smokers, discussing everything from cigars to music, 
sports, and politics, has emerged.  See, e.g., www.botl.org/community/forums; 
www.socialcigar.com.   
260 Dave Thier, Owl Shop: Old Yale in New Haven, YALE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 9, 2007 (longtime 





monolithic bar.261 Additionally, tobacco lounges effectively bear the costs of 
multiple periodical subscriptions, which, as they did in eighteenth-century 
England, promotes a lively and engaged reading culture and serves to ground 
conversation. 
Second, tobacco lounges are non-hierarchical.  Patrons are surprisingly 
socioeconomically diverse,262 and represent a wide range of occupations.263  
Certainly the products are not priced prohibitively: a cigar or shisha costs about as 
much as a drink at a conventional bar, and lasts much longer.264  Cigars are no 
longer the province of Wall Street fat cats; hookah is no longer an ethnic 
curiosity. In remaining open during the daytime hours, the tobacco lounge can 
serve as a gathering place for individuals in different professions, particularly the 
hospitality industry and retirees, who might otherwise not join the “happy hour” 
crowd.   
Third, tobacco lounges are accessible and inclusive, serving in many cases 
as a center of local or cultural community. Operational characteristics help to 
explain this phenomenon – in remaining open during the daytime, tobacco 
lounges assume a perpetuity in the social life of a city which conventional bars are 
unable to replicate. The uniquely conversational nature of tobacco lounges serves 
to make these places particularly inviting for local residents in search of relaxed, 
informal time with fellow residents. For shisha cafes, the accretion of local 
character is related to cultural traditions – the hookah bar functions as a 
neighborhood gathering place for Middle Eastern residents.  The inviting 
character of cigar bars develops along more strictly local lines – cigar bars 
function as gathering places for those who enjoy cigars, and assume a local 
character and identity along with a crowd of regulars. 
In asserting the uniquely conversational aspect of tobacco lounges, it is not 
necessary to claim that the social capital of a city relies exclusively on tobacco 
lounges. It is sufficient simply to note that tobacco lounges can be a fertile source 
for social capital and community vitality. We do not presume that all tobacco 
lounges meet the aspirations of the ideal “third place”, nor do we make the case 
that the shisha café or cigar bar is a perfect microcosm of political society – a 
melting pot of diverse interests and viewpoints, invariably erupting into rich 
discussion on pressing issues of social import. Perhaps some are, but they needn’t 
be. Nor do we assert that the cigar bar or shisha lounge is so inviting and 
accessible as to exercise an inexorable draw on all passers-by.  Tobacco lounges 
                                                 
261 See Vascallero, supra note 223 (quoting patron “"There's a certain atmosphere about a cigar bar 
where you feel more relaxed.”) 
262 NCI MONOGRAPH at 36; see also Gilpin & Pierce, supra note 237. 
263 See Appendix C. 
264 See Lewin, supra note 227 (student patron explaining relative inexpensiveness of a night at a 





do, however, welcome individuals interested in cigars or shisha, interests which 
cut across factors which have historically been linked with exclusion and 
hierarchy, such as race, class, and gender.   
Tobacco lounges, where they survive, play a role in modern cities which is 
both increasingly rare and valuable, functioning as a rich locus for the expression 
of the public sphere. As Habermas observed, “A portion of the public sphere 
comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to 
form a public body”.265  Places which promote this phenomenon warrant special 
attention. Not all individuals enjoy cigars or smoke hookah, but the tobacco 
lounge nonetheless creates a vibrant public sphere where individuals from widely 
varying walks of life assemble to enjoy a common pastime and conversation. And 
according to scholars who evaluate the health of democracy in modern America, 




Weighing the prongs of our balancing test, we find a relatively close case, 
but one which ultimately favors the exemption of tobacco lounges.  On the one 
hand, though the tobacco lounge plays a unique role in the social fabric of a city 
and addresses a pressing item of concern to American democracy, it is hardly the 
keystone by which the entire edifice will stands or falls.  On the other hand, the 
tobacco lounge fails entirely to offend the purpose of statewide ETS regimes. 
With an informed and consenting patron base, the open and notorious shisha cafe 
or cigar lounge presents a fundamentally different case than restaurants and bars, 
the main targets of ETS legislation.  Employees are fully on notice of the 
centrality of their product to the establishment, and the rarity of tobacco lounges 
in the hospitality industry means that the choice to work at such an establishment 
is not only meaningful, but jobs are hotly contested.  Moreover, a regime which 
prevents consenting individuals from assembling away from non-smokers for the 
purpose of smoking shisha pipes or cigars more severely offends general notions 
of personal autonomy than does a prohibition on smoking in restaurants. In the 
absence of specific guidance from ballot initiative states on this point, or clearer 
statements of legislative intent beyond a “broad construction” clause and general 
solicitude for the health of employees, failure to exempt tobacco lounges which 
present a unique circumstance under a conventional ETS regime simply exceeds 
the regulatory warrant.   
On balance, then, the tobacco lounge should receive some form of 
exemption from ETS legislation.  Both sides of the scale are weighted lightly, but 
                                                 
265 See Habermas, The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article, NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, Autumn 





the balance clearly favors exemption.  In an age characterized by the recession of 
the public sphere, places which promote its expression are uniquely valuable, and 
we should not eliminate them if we can conscientiously avoid doing so.   
 
E. EXEMPTION SCHEMES 
 
The question arises, however, how exempt?  Given the panoply of 
available models, legislators may find it difficult to evaluate the merits of 
exemption schemes.  Happily, in focusing attention on the merits and 
characteristics of the tobacco lounge, the balancing test can provide useful 
guidance.  On the one hand, care must be taken to ensure that the first side of the 
scale does not become overbalanced, and that conventional bars and cafes do not 
secure frivolous exemptions and subvert the default rule. On the other hand, the 
virtues of the tobacco lounge must be enabled by the exemption. Care must be 
taken to ensure that the exemption is meaningful; that clever definitions or 
practical consequences do not render the exemption illusory.     
 Ohio’s proposed amendment fails the first avenue of analysis.   Merely by 
constructing some form of on-site, walk-in humidor, and purchasing an 
inexpensive air filter, a bar can become a “cigar bar” and permit its patrons to 
smoke.  On the second, as we have seen, cigar bars and shisha cafes bear virtues 
precisely because their products – premium cigars and hookah – are conducive to 
conversation and local traditions.  Permitting any bar with the wherewithal to 
engage in minor remodeling to become a dumping ground for revelers who find a 
cigarette aptly to accompany their drinks unseats the virtue defense.  Accordingly, 
a per se exemption defined as in Ohio’s Senate Bill 195 is unwise.   
 Grandfather clauses are similarly problematic. In addition to expressing an 
inchoate principled basis for exemption, effectively stating “we don’t exempt you, 
but we feel bad, so we’ll look the other way,” grandfather clauses undermine the 
second half of the balancing test.  Stipulating that any change in ownership 
renders the exemption moot, grandfather clause exemptions function over the 
long haul as a death warrant.  Additionally, they prevent any future tobacco 
lounges from opening.  If an urban market will support another shisha café or 
cigar bar, provided some satisfactory definition can be achieved, there is no sound 
reason to prevent its operation while permitting the older establishment.  Finally, 
and most disturbingly, they grant a functional monopoly to proprieters of tobacco 
lounges.  Proprietors have the incentive to capitalize on their monopoly on 
smoking in public and cater to the masses of cigarette smokers who have been 





alcohol sales.  This irrevocably changes the character of, and undoes the virtues 
peculiar to, the traditional tobacco lounge.266 
 The best tobacco lounge exemptions currently in place are the per se 
exemptions which define tobacco bars as those receiving a certain percentage of 
gross profits from the on-site sale of tobacco products for consumption.  This 
scheme effectively balances the competing concerns: it prevents conventional 
bars from subverting the default rule, and simultaneously protects the shisha or 
cigar focus of the establishment and preserves the virtue defense. However, given 
the realities of pricing, and the fact that drinks tend to be more expensive than 
cigars or hookah, these lines can be difficult to draw.  Some establishments have 
taken to adding a cigar surcharge to meet requirements, some hookah bars simply 
cease to sell the more expensive alcohols.  Most cigar lounges simply raise the 
prices of cigars, deterring the diversity found in more traditional lounges.  
Furthermore, with sufficient ingenuity, proprietors of more conventional bars 
might be able to manipulate ledgers to satisfy exemption requirements. A superior 
per se definition might track the recent Oregon proposal, in preserving the 
structural characteristics of traditional cigar bars, but again, regulation efforts at 
this level are likely to be imperfect and exploitable.  
 One mechanism which has not been proposed, but which may furnish an 
optimal way to balance the twin concerns inherent in tobacco lounge exemptions, 
is to be found in local governments. Empowering local boards of health, in 
conjunction with chambers of commerce, to license the on-site sale of tobacco in 
much the same way that liquor licenses are currently issued, would permit 
establishments to be judged on a case-by-case basis, and more precisely evaluated 
for offense against the integrity of the ETS regime on one hand, and preservation 
of civic virtues on the other.267  Establishments which fail to live up to the ideal 
would be denied licenses.  This solution effectively manages the first concern, as 
boards of health can promulgate guidelines for distinguishing authentic tobacco 
lounges from mere chameleons.  The possibility of institutional overreaching 
which might undermine the virtues inherent in tobacco lounges might be 
effectively countered by the inclusion of members of the chamber of commerce 
on the review committee, and guidance could be provided in the form of a 
specific committee charge contained in the exemption language which accounts 
                                                 
266 Oregon, however, has recently proposed a bill which would create a grandfather clause 
exemption for cigar bars, but would limit exempted cigar bars to 40 patrons, and prohibit smoking 
anything but cigars. 2007 OR. LAWS 602.This addresses some of the concerns presented by 
grandfather clause exemptions, but falls liable to the characteristic inconsistency of principle.  
267 This has nearly been done in Oregon, which provides that the prohibition can be waived by the 
Department of Human Services “for any public place if it determines that: (1) There are valid 
reasons to do so; and (2) A waiver will not significantly affect the health and comfort of 






for the fact that the exemption is to be discharged in a manner as consistent as 
possible with promoting the vitality of local and cultural community at tobacco 




Many states have made inspiring progress in combating the involuntary 
exposure of their citizens to second-hand smoke, reversing the default rule on 
smoking in public. Increasingly, Americans live in a country in which smoking in 
public is generally prohibited, which is a remarkable achievement.  Much work, 
however, remains to be done to ensure that the default rule is reversed in a 
responsible manner.   
 In some states, this will mean passing more rigorous legislation.  Further 
study will be required, particularly with regard to the exemption of bars and 
casinos, which the Surgeon General identified as presenting serious ETS 
concerns. Presently, four states are considering implementing more meaningful 
ETS regimes. The Pennsylvania legislature is presently working to reconcile the 
exemption provisions of two bills currently in session, either of which would 
create a strong ETS regime.268 Iowa, South Dakota, and Indiana have legislation 
pending which would significantly strengthen the operation of their ETS 
regimes.269   
 In most other states, the challenge will be ensuring that the new default 
rule is implemented in a responsible manner, tailoring strong ETS regimes to 
remedy unduly draconian provisions as Ohio struggles to do.  Presently, proposed 
exemptions sit in committee, but the cigar bar exemption is deeply unsatisfactory 
and in need of redrafting. The Solicitor General of Ohio has asked the state 
Supreme Court to revisit the private club exemption, presenting an opportunity to 
remove the veil currently obscuring the deeply worrying passage of the Ohio 
Smoke Free Workplace Act.270 Oregon has a reasonably well-drafted bill before 
                                                 
268 Two bills were introduced in 2007. The Smoke Free Pennsylvania Act, 2007 PA. S.B. 246, 
would exempt cigar bars; the Clean Indoor Air Act, 2007 PA H.B. 720, would exempt both cigar 
bars and private clubs. A compromise committee has been convened to reconcile the two 
proposals. See Amy Worden, PA Smoking Ban: Not If, But How, THE PHILADELPHIA ENQUIRER, 
Feb. 28, 2008. 
269 H.B. 187, 82nd Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Ia. 2007) (Would undo the pre-emption provisions of the 
statewide ban); H.B. 1237, 83rd Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2008) (Would delete provisions 
from statewide smoking ban which permit smoking on licensed premises); H.B. 1057, 115th Gen. 
Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (In. 2008).  
270 See Ohio Lic’d Bev. Assn. v. Ohio Dep’t. Health, Case No. 2008-0356 (Ohio 2008) (docket 
available at 
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/clerk_of_court/ecms/resultsbycasenumber.asp?type=3&year=2008
&number=0356&myPage=searchbycasenumber%2Easp). The Solicitor General argues, in support 
of jurisdiction, that the statute must be construed as a whole to create a meaningful private club 





it, which would exempt cigar bars. Many other states which have recently 
implemented Class V regimes would be well served to revisit their exemption 
provisions. 
 This Article has attempted to provide some guidance, shedding light on 
the landscape of laws and highlighting some areas of concern presented by 
modern ETS regimes.  Ballot initiatives, in particular, raise disturbing questions, 
and tobacco lounges may warrant more attention than they have hitherto received.  
The balancing test proposed in this Article may offer a useful starting point for 
considering exemption schemes, which are the beating heart of responsible ETS 
legislation.   
 In conclusion, it is useful to be reminded that legislating the public health 
implicates important questions of both personal autonomy and public sociability. 
Certainly the Prohibition, if fully implemented, would have produced a healthier 
society, but at what cost? Smoking presents a different concern, with the 
dispersion of ambient tobacco smoke, and eliminating involuntary exposure is a 
proper regulatory goal.  However, clumsy legislation can serve to preclude 
voluntary exposure as well, with unnecessary and unfortunate effects.  In the last 
Part of this Article, consequences for the civic life of our democracy have been 
suggested. As we seek to optimize the health of our fellow-citizens by regulatory 
fiat, it is well to remember that the possibility of unnecessary casualties and 
undesirable consequences remains an ineluctable danger, that we may responsibly 

















                                                                                                                                     
14, 2008). The American Cancer Society has filed an extensive amicus brief on the basis that 
“From its inception, the amici have led efforts to draft, pass, and bring this law to fruition through 
a vote of the People, and prevent the People's will from being undermined”, and arguing that “the 
exemption ODH seeks to vindicate does not exist.” AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, OHIO DIVISION, 





APPENDIX A: STATEWIDE ETS LEGISLATION 













AL ALA. CODE § 18.35.300 et seq.  No 2003 II Yes Yes 
AK ALASKA STAT. § 18.35.300 et seq.  No 1990 II Yes Yes 
AZ ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01  Yes 2007 V Yes No 
AR ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-27-1801 et seq. Yes 2006 III Yes Yes272 
CA CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5 Yes 1997 IV Yes Yes 
CO COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-14-201 et 
seq.  
Yes 2006 IV Yes Yes*  
CT CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-342 et seq. Yes 2004 IV No Yes*  
DE DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2901 et seq. Yes 2002 V No No 
DC D.C. CODE § 7-731 et seq. Yes 2007 IV Yes Yes 
FL FLA. STAT. § 386.201 et seq. Yes 2003 III Yes Yes 
GA GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12A-1 et seq. Yes 2005 III Yes Yes 
HI HAW. REV. STAT.  § 328J-3 et seq. Yes 2006 V No No 
ID IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-5501 et seq.  No 2007 II Yes Yes 
IL ILL. COMP. STAT. 82/10-410  Yes 2008 V Yes No 
IN IND. CODE § 16-41-37-1 et seq.  Pending273 1998 II Yes Yes 
IA IOWA CODE § 142.B et seq.  Pending274 1993 I Yes Yes 
KS KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4009 et seq. No  1987 II Yes Yes 
KY KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.165 et seq. No 2006 II Yes Yes 
LA LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.251 et seq. No 2007 III Yes Yes 
ME ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1541 et seq. Yes 2007 IV Yes275 Yes*276 
MD MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. §§ 24-205 
& 24-501 et seq. 
Yes 2008 V Yes No 
MA MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 270, § 22 et seq.  Yes 2004 IV Yes Yes 
MI MICH COMP. LAWS § 333.12601 et seq.  No 1989 II Yes Yes 
MN MINN. STAT. § 144.414 et seq. Yes 2007 V Yes No 
MS MISS. CODE ANN. § 29-5-161 et seq.  No 2000 II Yes Yes 
MO MO. REV. STAT. § 191.765 et seq. No 1992 II Yes Yes 
MT MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-40-101  Yes 2009 V277 No No 
NE NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5701 et seq. Yes 2009 II Yes Yes 
NV NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 202.2483 et seq. Yes 2006 III Yes Yes 
NH N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155:64 et seq. Yes 2007 V No278 No 
                                                 
* Designates a tobacco lounge exemption protected through a grandfather clause. 
271 Reverses default rule by prohibiting smoking in restaurants and bars 
272 The statute’s exemption applies to all bars, not merely tobacco bars. 
273 See H.B. 1057, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (In. 2008). 
274 See H.B. 187, 82nd Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Ia. 2007) 
275 The Maine Legislature amended the Clean Indoor Law in May 2007, specifically prohibiting 
smoking hookah in tobacco specialty stores licensed after January 1st, 2007. 
276 Maine exempts “tobacco specialty stores” that, by the end of 2006, possessed licenses to serve 
alcohol or food. This statute functions in precisely the same way as a grandfather clause 
exemption for tobacco bars. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 1542(L) (“Smoking is not prohibited in a tobacco 
specialty store. The on-premises service, preparation or consumption of food or drink, if the 
tobacco specialty store is not licensed for such service or consumption prior to January 1, 2007, is 
prohibited in such a store.”). 
277 Montana will become a Category V state once  its bars go smoke-free on October 1st, 2009. 
278 There is no explicit exemption for retail tobacco shops. “Smoking may,” however, according to 





NJ N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-55 et seq. Yes 2006 IV Yes Yes 
NM N.M. STAT. § 24-16-1 et seq. Yes 2007 IV Yes Yes*  
NY N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1399-n et seq. Yes 2003 IV Yes Yes*  
NC N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-595 et seq. No 1993 I Yes Yes 
ND N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-9 et seq. No 2007279 III Yes Yes 
OH OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3794.01 Yes 2007 V Yes280 No 
OK OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-1521 et seq. No 2003 II Yes Yes 
OR OR. REV. STAT. §§ 433.835 et seq. Yes 2009 III Yes Yes 
PA 35 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1230.1; 
1235.1; 1223.5; & 361 
Pending281 1988 I Yes Yes 
RI R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.10-1 et seq. Yes 2004 IV Yes Yes 
SC S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-95-10 et seq. No 1990 II Yes Yes 
SD S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-36-2 et seq. Pending282 2002 I Yes Yes 
TN  TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1801 et seq.  No 2007 III Yes Yes283 
TX TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.01 No 1975 II Yes Yes 
UT  UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-38-1 et seq. Yes 2007284 V285 No No 
VT VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 37-1741 et seq. Yes 2005 V No No 
VA VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2801 et seq. No 1990 II Yes Yes 
WA WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.010 et seq. Yes 2005 V No No 
WV W. VA. CODE § 16-9A-4 et seq. & 31-20-
5b 
No 1987 II Yes Yes 
WI WIS. STAT. § 101.123 No 1983 II Yes Yes 
















                                                                                                                                     
buildings and offices, including workplaces . . . in effectively segregated smoking-permitted areas 
designated by the person in charge.” NH Rev Stat. §§ 155:66.  
279 Legislative Assembly rejected exemptions from prior Act, which became effective in 2005. 
280 The exemption is narrowly worded, however, stipulating that retail shops must stand alone. 
Currently operating retail shops are exempt from the operation of this narrow definition by 
grandfather clause. 
281 See note 268, supra. 
282 See note 269, supra.  
283 Exempts all age-restricted (21 and over) venues. 
284 Some exemptions – private clubs and taverns – are preserved until 2009. 
285 II until 2009, when exemptions disappear. 









State Issue 5 Certified Ballot Language 
Prohibit smoking in places of employment and most public places - Smoke Free 
PROPOSED LAW 
(Proposed by Initiative Petition) 
To enact Chapter 3794. of the Ohio Revised Code to restrict smoking in places of 
employment and most places open to the public. 
The proposed law would:  
• Prohibit smoking in public places and places of employment;  
• Exempt from the smoking restrictions certain locations, including private 
residences (except during the hours that the residence operates as a place 
of business involving non-residents of the private residence), designated 
smoking rooms in hotels, motels, and other lodging facilities; designated 
smoking areas for nursing home residents; retail tobacco stores, outdoor 
patios, private clubs, and family-owned and operated places of business;  
• Authorize a uniform statewide minimum standard to protect workers and 
the public from secondhand tobacco smoke;  
• Allow for the declaration of an establishment, facility, or outdoor area as 
nonsmoking;  
• Require the posting of “No Smoking” signs, and the removal of all 
ashtrays and similar receptacles from any area where smoking is 
prohibited;  
• Specify the duties of the department of health to enforce the smoking 
restrictions  
• Create in the state treasury the “smoke free indoor air fund;”  
• Provide for the enforcement of the smoking restrictions and for the 
imposition of civil fines upon anyone who violates the smoking 
restrictions.  
a majority yes vote is necessary for passage.  
  YES  
  NO  






APPENDIX C: A SNAPSHOT OF A CIGAR BAR 
 
I. SURVEY METHODS 
 
A one-page survey form was given to every patron at the Owl Shop, a cigar bar in 
New Haven, Connecticut, who entered between 3:30 and 4:30 on Saturday, March 
15, 2008.  There were three non-respondents.  The survey asked: 
 
1. How many times per week do you come to the Owl Shop? Of those times, how many do 
you have a cigar? 
2. What time do you typically come to the Owl Shop, and how long do you typically stay? 
3. Do you find the Owl Shop to be more or less conducive to conversation than other social 
establishments? Please explain. 
4. At the Owl Shop, do you find yourself talking with new people (a) never; (b) sometimes; 
or (c) often? 
5. Please circle any of the following subjects frequently covered during your conversations 
at the Owl Shop: local politics, national politics, local cultural events, local news,    
6. What do you do for a living?  
7. Would you mind sharing your age, gender, and ethnicity? 
8. Are you a New Haven resident?   
9.  How many cigars do you smoke per week? Of those, how many at the Owl Shop?   
10. Why do you smoke cigars? 
11. How would you describe the Owl Shop to someone who had never been here?  
 
II. SUMMARY OF RESPONSES 
 
The snapshot revealed an overwhelmingly regular patron base, with a few 
newcomers. Patrons who had been there before averaged 1.3 visits per week.  
Nearly all came for the purpose of smoking a premium cigar, and 76% found the 
Owl Shop exceptionally conducive to conversation. Every patron was a smoker. 
The average reported length of stay was just over three hours. 59% of respondents 
“often” conversed with new people, with 36% reporting occasional conversations 
with new people.  42% reported frequently discussing local politics, with 63% 
reporting similarly for national politics, 68% for local cultural events, and 68% 
for local news.  Respondents’ occupations ranged across both traditionally blue-
collar and white-collar fields.   
Survey results reveal a rich, convivial atmosphere, in which patrons feel 
comfortable interacting with strangers.  “The atmosphere of the Shop is relaxing 
and I feel more comfortable talking to people I don’t know.” Many respondents 
cited the “relaxing” atmosphere as encouraging conversation. Respondents 
associated a shared affinity for cigars as an essential component of this 
conviviality: “Cigars open up people to talk” (V) and provide “common ground” 
(M), a “common bond”, (E) and “something in common” (R). G wrote “Smoking 
cigars is also something I won’t do by myself.” 
Describing the Owl Shop, respondents noted a relaxed, intimate atmosphere 
(C)(D)(K)(L) (S) and a friendly clientele (B)(J)(N)(Q)(U).  For one respondent 
(F), the Owl Shop was “home away from home”, for another (A) “a bar in which 
you can sit & enjoy a drink & a smoke in a cozy atmosphere w/intelligent 
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A .25 (Y) LA (2) More. Sometimes. LP, NP, LN Architect 27, M, 
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2-4 (2-4) 
J 2 (Y) NR 
 (2-3) 
More. Often. LP, NP, LC, 
LN 
Service 29, M, 
White 
2 (2) 










M 1 (Y) A (2) More. Often. NP, LC, LN Restaurateur 42, M, 
White 
N/R 





O .5 (Y) LA/E (1) Same. Never. NP, Sports Real Estate  43, M, 
White 
3 (N/R) 
P .25 (N) E (2) Same. Sometimes. International 
Politics 
Student 27, F,  
N/A 
0 (0) 
Q 1 (Y) E (2) Same. Sometimes. LP, NP, LC, 
LN 
Real Estate 30, M, 
White 
1 (1) 
R 3 (Y) A (5) More. Yes. NP, LC Restaurateur 34, M, 
White 
2 (N/R) 
S 1 (N) LA (NR) Yes. Often. LC Geographer 42, F, 
White 
0 (0) 












V 2.5 (Y) E (4-6) More Often LP, NP, LC, 
LN 




                                                 
287 A: Afternoon (12-3 PM); LA: Late Afternoon (4-6 PM); E: Evening (7 PM and on) 
288 Intends to be a weekly regular.   
